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*
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**
 
Abstract 
                 This paper offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about 
whether legal scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world.  To the extent there is a 
disconnect, we believe neither scholars nor the real world of governance are necessarily at 
fault.  Instead, the disconnect stems from a failure to forge connections between theoretical 
constructs in the academic literature and their applicability to real world conditions.  In part, this 
article is an effort to make such connections through close attention to context in regulatory 
design. 
In an insightful recent article, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, Professor David 
Freeman Engstrom offers a conceptual framework for reorienting the literature on regulatory 
enforcement by shifting the focus from a choice between public and private enforcement to 
analysis of how best to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent public and private 
enforcers by vesting in federal agencies “gatekeeping authority” over private enforcement 
lawsuits.  Professor Engstrom discusses theoretical concerns about allowing private actors to 
bring enforcement cases, and the challenges present in designing welfare-maximizing 
gatekeeping regimes. Professor Engstrom suggests design options for rationalizing public and 
private enforcement lawsuits through a public “gatekeeping” scheme that range from 
empowering agencies to be “extremely interventionist” gatekeepers to restricting them to a much 
more limited role in shaping private enforcement efforts.  
Our article evaluates and builds on Professor Engstrom’s important effort to rationalize 
government and private enforcement of regulatory norms by considering his effort in the context 
of challenges facing government enforcers in the real world, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in particular.  We suggest that agencies such as EPA confront at least five design 
challenges in developing pragmatic enforcement strategies:  the inter-related character of 
different components of the regulatory process; the hybrid character of contemporary governance 
efforts; the importance of confronting “reality” in the form of past performance and future 
challenges and opportunities; the dynamic character of contemporary governance and responses 
to it; and the salience of possible design changes, which suggests the need to prioritize design 
improvements.  Our view is that pursuing sensible regulatory design, including mechanisms of 
the sort Professor Engstrom proposes, requires a sophisticated understanding of the regulatory 
landscape and that our conceptual framework provides a useful typology for developing such an 
understanding.   In short, our article attempts a synthesis of Professor Engstrom’s valuable 
insights about the value of optimizing regulatory enforcement initiatives with our own 
conception of the manner in which the regulatory state operates in order to provide a 
contextually-based, pragmatic framework for optimizing regulatory design to promote 
compliance with regulatory norms.  
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Introduction 
The search for optimal regulatory design is a long-standing one with no clear end in sight.  
A recent entry in the legal academic literature, Professor David Freeman Engstrom’s Agencies as 
Litigation Gatekeepers,
1
 refers to the scholarly debate surrounding optimal regulatory design 
while focusing primarily on the “institutional design challenge” raised by regulatory 
enforcement.
2
  More specifically, Professor Engstrom calls for a reorientation of the literature 
from focusing on a choice between public and private enforcement to instead focusing on how 
best to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent public and private enforcers by 
vesting in federal agencies “gatekeeping authority” over private enforcement lawsuits.3   
Acknowledging the importance of context in regulatory design,
4
 Professor Engstrom 
discusses theoretical concerns about allowing private actors to bring enforcement cases, such as 
overzealousness, challenges in coordination between private and public enforcers, and risks to 
legislative fidelity.
5
  He also addresses the challenges that “bureaucratic behavioral pathologies” 
such as possible agency capture, agency self-aggrandizement, agencies’ predilections for overly 
cautious behavior, and the influence of careerist incentives of agency personal present in 
designing gatekeeping regimes that will prove to be welfare-maximizing.
6
 Professor Engstrom 
suggests a minimum of five design dimensions for rationalizing public and private enforcement 
lawsuits through establishment of a public “gatekeeping” scheme to set parameters for private 
enforcement, ranging from empowering agencies to be “extremely interventionist” gatekeepers 
to playing a much more limited role in shaping private enforcement efforts.
7
   
This Essay evaluates and builds on Professor Engstrom’s important theoretical effort to 
rationalize government and private enforcement of regulatory norms by considering his effort in 
the context of challenges facing government enforcers in the real world.
8
   It engages Professor 
                                                             
1
 David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290843. 
2
 Id. at ___ [ms at 3, 9]. 
3
 Id. at __ [ms at 4-5]. 
4
 Id. at __ [ms at 26] (noting, for example, that “an important theme . . . is that optimal gatekeeper design is likely to 
be highly contextual and grounded in the realities of a given regulatory regime.”  He also notes that “any assessment 
of the institutional competence and capacity of agencies to perform gatekeeper tasks will necessarily be 
comparative. . . .   The question is whether agencies can . . . make better judgments [of competing modes of 
enforcement in a complex regulatory regime] . . . or do so more quickly or cheaply, than other institutional actors.”  
Id. at 31. 
5
 Id. at ___ [ms at 10-17]. 
6
 Id. at .___ [ms at 39-41] 
7
 As he puts it, the typology is “designed to be a useful tool, as regulatory designers who desire relatively greater or 
lesser agency control over private litigation efforts can simply move up or down the taxonomic ladder.”  Id. at 26. 
8 This paper offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about whether legal scholarship is 
(in)sufficiently tethered to the real world by attempting a synthesis of Professor Engstrom’s valuable theoretical 
insights about the value of optimizing regulatory enforcement initiatives with our own conception of the manner in 
which the regulatory state operates.  Our goal is to provide a contextually-based, pragmatic framework for 
optimizing regulatory design to promote compliance with regulatory norms.  For differing views about the value of 
legal scholarship in terms of the resolution of real-world challenges, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (endorsing 
scholarship that reflects “a healthy balance of theory and doctrine”); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship 
as Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 204 (2010) (urging scholarship that “is both grounded and 
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Engstrom’s attempt to optimize regulatory design of agency gatekeeping of private enforcement 
by highlighting, and elaborating on, five key elements of a conceptual framework that we believe 
will contribute to improved regulatory design, including but not limited to efforts to enhance 
regulatory compliance. While Professor Engstrom addresses the experiences of a broad range of 
agencies in his search for optimal design, our proposed framework is based on the experience of 
a single agency, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
9
  
First, efforts to advance optimal regulatory design need to consider the fundamentally 
inter-related character of different aspects of the regulatory process.  In the world of 
environmental regulation, for example, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes 
that “[c]ompliance with pollution control laws is addressed through a continuum of response 
mechanisms, ranging from compliance assistance to administrative and civil enforcement, to the 
stronger criminal enforcement.”10  We believe that the continuum is even broader than the CRS 
report suggests, reaching at least as far back as the initial adoption of regulatory requirements.  
Further, these response mechanisms are inter-related rather than independent.  As a result, a 
search for optimal regulatory design, even if limited to the design of discrete parts of the process 
such as Professor Engstrom’s focus on gatekeeping strategies for formal enforcement,11 must 
consider the full range of activities that comprise the regulatory process as well as the results that 
process produces.  The taxonomy we offer below highlights key features of the regulatory 
process and types of interconnections that require attention as part of optimal regulatory design 
efforts.
12
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
theoretical, actively involved in the world of its subject matter, and for that reason, able to think about it in fresh 
ways”). 
9
 We are most familiar with EPA and hence have focused on regulatory design issues based on that agency’s 
compliance promotion strategies.  The search for optimal regulatory design is likely to be highly dependent on 
context, as Engstrom and others have noted.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 640, 662, 685 (2013); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. 
Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. ___ (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the multiple dimensions along which regulatory authority 
may be allocated and the potential value of allocating authority along functional lines).  As others have noted, this 
context dependency holds true of the design of enforcement regimes.  See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role 
of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2012) (discussing a 
“unified approach to the design of private enforcement mechanisms better tailored to the exigencies of particular 
regulatory regimes”).   
10
 Robert Esworthy, Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They Enforced?, Congressional Research Service 
Report 19 (June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?]; U.S. EPA Office of Compliance, 
Guide to Calculating Environmental Benefits from EPA Enforcement Cases – FY 2012 Update vii, I-6 (January 10, 
2012 Final) (providing guidance about how to collect information on the “results and environmental benefits” from 
concluded federal enforcement cases). 
11
 Professor Engstrom discusses different criteria by which agencies might exercise their gatekeeping functions, 
including allowing private suits based on the probability that the private action will prevail in court or on a much 
broader set of considerations such as the implications of allowing private actions for legislative fidelity.  Engstrom, 
supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 35].  Our argument here focuses on gatekeeping with the latter perspective as our 
backdrop.  Professor Engstrom acknowledges that the line between enforcement litigation generally and other 
aspects of regulation is becoming “increasingly blurred.”  Id. at ___ [ms at 6]. 
12
 See infra Part I.   These interconnections work in both directions, as design and implementation of other stages of 
the regulatory process influence optimal design and implementation of the gatekeeping element that Professor 
Engstrom highlights and vice versa. 
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Second, efforts to achieve optimal regulatory design should be mindful of the hybrid 
character of contemporary governance.  Governance is much more than simply the actions of 
government actors, as Engstrom’s analysis of the interaction of public and private enforcement 
reflects.  Again, however, the range of actors is broader than agency and private enforcers, and  
governance often benefits (or suffers) from the actions of these multiple stakeholders.
13
  As 
Environmental Law Institute President John C. Cruden has put it, most of those in Cruden’s 
generation “in the environmental world grew up on public law.”14  As a result, it is especially 
important in the search for optimal regulatory design not only to acknowledge the reality, but 
also to assess both the promise and perils of different variations of hybrid governance (or, as 
Professor Engstrom characterizes it, “the pluralistic regulatory landscape”).15  Engstrom also 
refers to the “complex ecologies of enforcement” within which multiple public and private 
enforcers operate and with which they interact.
16
  As others have amply demonstrated, these 
“complex ecologies” extend beyond ex post enforcement actions by either public or private 
actors.
17
  One key insight from this central feature of contemporary governance is that efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The search for optimal regulatory design should consider informal controls as well and the relationship 
between regulatory efforts and other efforts to induce desirable environmental behavior.  See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson 
et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strategies, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 231. 265 (2013) (discussing a “symbiosis between formal and informal controls” and arguing that 
“[f]ormal sanctions do not work in isolation”).  It also should consider inter-governmental relationships.  Professor 
Engstrom focuses almost exclusively on ex post enforcement against regulated parties after they have (allegedly) 
violated legal requirements, giving almost no attention to coordination between federal and state actors in that effort.  
He does not spend much time on the challenge of rationalizing government enforcement, independent of private 
actors.  For assessments of this challenge, see, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in 
a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(2000) [hereinafter Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement].  For another recent example of analysis of regulatory 
design of public enforcement mechanisms, see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 
127 HARV. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming Jan. 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2296087 (focusing on how financial incentives can spur public 
enforcement). 
13
 See, e.g., Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of Non-State Actors in the 
Regulatory Process, 7 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 114, 118 (2013) (suggesting that advances in technology may 
engender “wiki-regulation”); THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. 
Salamon ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT]; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).  Engstrom identifies some of the perils of reliance on private 
enforcement, as have others.  See, e.g., Grabosky, supra, at 119 (noting concerns about private regulatory failure, the 
potential for private voices to be ignored, lack of accountability, and private overzealousness when acting in a 
regulatory capacity).   As Grabosky colorfully puts it, the sword of citizen participation is two-edged.  One would 
not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts.  Id. at ___.  See also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).  
14
 John C. Cruden, The Brave New World of Private Governance, 30 ENVTL. F. 60, 60 (2013).    
15
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 9]. 
16
 Id. 
17
 According to Professor Delmas, “the inadequacy of governments to resolve some environmental issues has 
generated the search for alternative governance mechanisms.”  GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 223 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT].  There are enormous varieties of governance, including self-regulation in 
the form of Responsible Care, see American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care, 
http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/?gclid=CN6klbiLkroCFQ-g4AodLVQAIQ, supply chain influences, 
certification schemes, and others.  See ISO 14001: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2004); Cruden, supra 
note __ (discussing private certification standards for private forests); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-
Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).  In Grabosky’s terms, regulatory instruments may entail elements 
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enhance compliance should take into account how best to engage all stakeholders at different 
stages of the regulatory process, not just public officials and NGO litigants during the ex post 
stage of enforcement litigation.
18
 
A third, different type of contextual feature that is particularly relevant to the question of 
optimal design of regulatory enforcement structures, and of agency authority to engage in 
gatekeeping of private enforcement initiatives, is what we term the “reality check” contextual 
feature.  In revisiting regulatory design it is critical to assess the agency’s (here EPA’s) actual 
performance in conducting enforcement, the challenges the agency faces, and opportunities to 
improve performance by altering regulatory features or practices.  
The degree of dynamism is the fourth feature of regulation that we suggest regulatory 
designers should consider.  This is not a feature that receives much attention in Agencies as 
Litigation Gatekeepers, but we believe it deserves “front-and-center” status.  Optimal regulatory 
design requires an understanding of the extent to which key features of regulation are likely to be 
static or dynamic over time.  This feature differs from the third feature in that it focuses not on 
whether existing regulatory practices have worked as anticipated even if the environment in 
which those practices occur has remained static, but on whether the environment itself has 
shifted in ways that affect regulatory goals.  For example, changes in agency personnel and 
financial resources, improvements in monitoring technology, and the capacity of regulated 
parties and NGOs to participate in regulatory implementation are among a litany of factors that 
affect EPA’s capacity for effective governance.19  EPA is relying heavily on new monitoring 
tools and data management capabilities to address compliance challenges, as we discuss below.
20
  
Thus, another contextual feature highlighted in this Essay as an indispensable component of 
regulatory design is awareness of the likelihood that capabilities and interests of different key 
actors throughout the entire regulatory enterprise will change over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of state, self-regulatory, and third-party activity.  Grabosky, supra note __, at 120.  See also id. at 118 (noting the 
“enormous potential for digital technology to enhance the regulatory capacity of ordinary citizens,” including the 
potential for citizens to “assist in labor-intensive investigation of non-compliance”).  While the scholarship on such 
hybrid forms of governance is growing rapidly, Professor Delmas suggests that “the research on environmental 
governance without government, or between government and other actors, is only just emerging.”  For discussion of 
some of the challenges posed by hybrid governance challenges in the law review literature, see David L. Markell, 
“Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. 
REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Markell, Slack]; Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State 
Environmental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies, 33 
ENVTL. L.REP.. 10559 (2003). 
18
 For one effort to identify key actors in the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, see Esworthy, 
How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 1 (listing federal, state, tribal, and local governments, regulated parties, 
courts, interest groups, and the general public as relevant stakeholders). 
19
 There is a rich literature that investigates the ways in which regulated parties are motivated by a variety of factors, 
including utilitarian considerations as well as cultural norms and habits, and it is worthwhile to consider all of these 
sources of motivation in regulatory design.  See, e.g.,GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 9, 
223; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda P. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 715 (2011); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation 
Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101(2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A 
Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003); Neil 
Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan &Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses 
Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).  
20
 See infra Part III. 
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A final part of the regulatory design puzzle that we address in this Essay is the 
importance of salience.  In a world of limited resources, it is important to ask the “relative 
priority” question in designing the regulatory process to improve compliance:  how important is 
it for policy makers to improve the design of a particular part of the regulatory process?  
Rationalizing integration of private enforcers into the public compliance promotion effort clearly 
holds promise for improving regulatory compliance, in the environmental context and elsewhere.  
It is clear, however, that very promising opportunities for transforming regulatory design to 
improve compliance lie in a broader consideration of the roles that all stakeholders can play 
during the multiple phases of the regulatory process, including some that precede litigation and 
related ex post processes. In some circumstances, focusing on agency gatekeeping strategies to 
influence NGOs’ capacity to litigate during the ex post stage of formal enforcement could 
preclude or undermine pursuit of other opportunities to improve regulatory design to enhance 
compliance that have more potential to produce desired results.
21
  In setting priorities for 
regulatory re-design this full gamut of possibilities deserves careful attention.   
In short, we endorse Professor Engstrom’s call to reorient the literature from focusing on 
a choice between public and private enforcement to assessing how best to integrate these two 
forms of enforcement.
22
  But we believe this reorientation’s chances for success will be greatly 
enhanced by greater awareness of the broader contextual framework described here.  Part I’s 
taxonomy of the regulatory process highlights the first two elements of our framework – the need 
for “integration on steroids” to understand the interconnectedness of different phases of the 
regulatory process and the promise of engaging a wide array of key actors throughout that 
process, not simply rationalization of the roles of the public and private enforcers engaged in ex 
post litigation.  Part II focuses on the third and fourth elements – the importance in regulatory 
design of understanding an agency’s track record and how the regulatory landscape may change 
in the future.  Finally, in an effort to crystallize the importance of salience, Part III provides a 
brief overview of an EPA initiative to re-invent its promotion of compliance with the Clean 
Water Act (CWA)’s regulatory requirements.  The CWA allows for citizen suits, an enforcement 
mechanism that has been widely used by NGOs and that has generated considerable judicial 
scrutiny and academic commentary.  Yet, the role of private enforcement is not even on EPA’s 
radar screen as a focus of enhancing compliance with CWA obligations, at least based on the 
guidance documents and other materials EPA has issued to date.  Instead, EPA is clearly giving 
priority attention to a wide range of other design and implementation challenges.  EPA thus 
appears to believe that the most promising efforts to improve the aspects of regulatory design 
that bear on compliance lie in initiatives other than rationalizing public and private enforcement, 
creating an interesting contrast between Professor Engstrom’s characterization of agency 
gatekeeping of private enforcement as a central challenge in the modern regulatory state and the 
                                                             
21
 While we focus here on the importance of using a wider lens to revisit regulatory design, we do not deny that  
efforts to assess public and private enforcement are valuable as well.  There is a rich literature on such efforts.  See, 
e.g., Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note __, at 661, 671 (noting that the “range of possible combinations of 
public and private enforcement . . . is substantial and complex,” and discussing whether to create private actions, the 
economic incentives for them, and access rules as among the issues to be addressed); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 93 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
185 (2000); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of 
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985). 
22
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 5]. 
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apparent perspective of one prominent agency and its key stakeholders of the central challenges 
the agency faces. 
I. A Proposed Taxonomy of Effective Regulation: A Brief Overview 
Numerous models of regulation, and hence effective regulation, exist.  For example, in 
the environmental field, many commentators characterize traditional regulation as “command-
and-control.”  According to Professors Cole and Grossman, “’[c]ommand-and-control’ is in 
essence a regulatory approach whereby the government ‘commands’ pollution reductions (e.g., 
by setting emissions standards) and ‘controls’ how these reductions are achieved (e.g., through 
the installation of specific pollution-control technologies).”23  Other variations include market-
based approaches to regulation,
24
 ambient-based approaches,
25
 “new governance” approaches,26 
and adaptive regulation.
27
  Each type of regulation has different features, and requires different 
things to work well for it to be effective.
28
 
Regardless of the type of regulation used, for our purposes in this Essay the salient point 
is that enforcement, including optimized government gatekeeping of private enforcement, is at 
most only one feature of an effective regulatory scheme.
29
  While enforcement is often 
                                                             
23
 Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the 
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 
887 n.1 (1999).  As others have pointed out, the term command-and-control is a pejorative term whose use arose out 
an effort by regulated businesses to depict environmental regulation as the product of “overregulation, big 
government, and bureaucratic zealotry.”  Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 234-35 (2011).  See also David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing 
Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 76 (2009) (substituting the term “traditional 
regulation” for “command-and-control regulation” “[t]o avoid confusion and misleading pejorative terminology”).  
As Cole and Grossman point out, critics of traditional regulation have even equated command-and-control 
regulation “with ‘Soviet-style’ regulation and ‘socialist central planning,’ implying that it is both endemically 
inefficient and democratically illegitimate.”  Cole & Grossman, supra, at 887. 
24
 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 to 7651o (emissions trading program to reduce acid rain). 
25
 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (water quality standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (national ambient air quality standards). 
26
 E.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515 (2013); 
Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory 
Law and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227; Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 
(2009); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004). 
27
 E.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, __ VAND. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming 2014) (discussing three models of regulation, traditional regulation, market-based approaches 
to regulation, and adaptive regulation), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222009.  
The list in the text is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.  For a succinct review of several types of regulation, 
see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE (1995). 
28
 Simpson et al., supra note __, at 237-38 (describing different features of command-and-control and self-
regulation); Craig & Ruhl., supra note __ (suggesting that the type of regulation used may affect the salience or 
importance of attributes or features).  Definitions of “effectiveness” vary based not only on the tools or strategies 
that are supposed to be used in a particular regulatory scheme, but also on regulatory goals. 
29
 Some “regulatory” design approaches may not include an enforcement component at all or it may be quite remote 
or understated, such as EPA’s 33/50 strategy.  For descriptions of that program, see U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 33/50 Program: The Final Record, EPA-745-R-99-004 (March 
1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf; Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, EPA's 
Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Release and Economic Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 1 (1999). 
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characterized as essential to effective regulation,
30
 it is not enough to achieve desired 
environmental protection policy objectives.  The head of EPA’s enforcement office recently 
acknowledged this reality, noting that “[w]hile enforcement is an essential part of EPA’s 
compliance program, it is not realistic to think that enforcement alone will get us to the levels of 
compliance envisioned by our rules.”31   
 Although it is possible to describe the components of effective regulation in many 
ways,
32
 we think it has at least five key characteristics: clear norms, achievability, verifiability, 
an optimal mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy.
33
  Among other things, 
adherence to these characteristics should facilitate regulatory compliance, including achieving a 
“rationalized” or optimal mix of public and private enforcement.  Indeed, understanding these 
characteristics and the inter-relationships among them in the context of a particular regulatory 
system is, in our view, critical to designing a rationalized mix of such enforcement. 
First, regulators should strive for clarity and certainty; the goal should be to create clear 
expectations for acceptable (and unacceptable) conduct.  It is difficult to achieve objectives, for 
example, without understanding what they are.  Participants across the spectrum of interested 
stakeholders recognize the value of establishing clear standards for regulated parties to meet.  
                                                             
30
 See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __.  See also Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong 
Enforcement Works Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 
MD. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (2013) (describing “what can be accomplished when a regulatory agency and [the 
Department of Justice] are willing to devote substantial resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement 
initiative”). 
31
 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 23 (2013). 
32
 Efforts to define effective regulation have appeared in assessments of environmental and other forms of 
regulation.  See, e.g., Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 
423 (1982) (former EPA Administrator listing as characteristics of effective regulation clarity and certainty, 
reasonableness and fairness, and efficiency and cost-effectiveness); Meredith James, Results-Based Environmental 
Regulation in Canada: Creative Solution or Re-Branding Regulation?, 19 J. ENV. L. & PRAC. 139, 143 (2009) 
(“Effectiveness and efficiency are usually the primary focus of the debate regarding regulatory tool selection.  
Characteristics of effective regulation include clear, measurable, enforceable standards and mandatory language.  
Implementation plans work to ensure efficacy by providing clear jurisdiction and/or cooperation between different 
levels of government, effective compliance and enforcement mechanisms (including incentives and penalties), and 
adequate resources for both implementation and enforcement.”).  Cf. Dr. Paul Harpur, New Governance and the 
Role of Public and Private Monitoring of Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile 
and Apparel Industry, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1 (2010-2011) (“Effective regulation has three essential components.  
First, the law must develop standards; second, there must be sufficient monitoring of compliance to detect non-
compliance; and third, there must be some form of motivation to avoid non-compliance.”) (citing STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 5 (1982)); Report of the Committee on Ethics, 15 ENERGY L.J. 193, 195 (1994) 
(listing as components of effective ethics regulation moral resonance, clarity of purposes, non-triviality, practicality, 
equity, and proportionality). There also is an obvious tension between different regulatory features or objectives.  
For example, there may be tension between the goal of clarity and simplicity and the capacity to tailor regulation to 
individual circumstances through the use of differentiated procedural or substantive requirements. 
33
 One could easily compartmentalize the features of the regulatory process differently, even if one were to agree 
with the thrust of our effort.  For example, our first two categories overlap to some degree, though we think they are 
sufficiently distinct to deserve separate treatment.  Similarly, one could separate the carrot-oriented approach to 
promoting compliance and the stick-oriented set of options, which we have combined.  Additionally, we have not 
created a separate element to acknowledge the options for self-regulation that play an increasingly important role in 
regulation today.  Further, achieving desired results is obviously one of the indicia of effectiveness.  Our typology is 
simply intended to provide a big picture sense of different key elements of the regulatory process as conventionally 
understood.   
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Complaints about indeterminacy are heard from regulated parties as well as members of the 
public.
34
  The government has internalized this message as well, with the head of EPA’s 
enforcement office recently acknowledging that “we should focus on greater simplicity and 
clarity [in our regulations].  One of the principles we have learned over years of hard experience 
is that compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear.”35  This message is most 
obviously salient for the development of regulations,
36
 but it is also important in the development 
of guidance and the exercise of enforcement discretion.
37
 
This feature of effective regulation has the potential to influence the agency gatekeeper 
design dimensions that Engstrom identifies.
38
  We offer two examples to illustrate the 
connection.  First, the clearer the substantive rules that govern the conduct of regulated entities, 
the lower the risk that courts, responding to suits by NGOs, will accept novel applications of 
legal mandates that amount to legislative drift.
39
  Under these circumstances, all other things 
being equal, the need for agencies to exercise veto authority over private enforcement efforts at 
the retail level should decline.
40
  Second, clear requirements may dramatically reduce the need 
                                                             
34
 At the far end of the continuum are cases such as General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1995), in which the D.C. Circuit rejected an EPA enforcement action against GE because EPA’s rules did not 
provide sufficiently clear norms.  Probably more typically, lack of clarity leads to delays and increases in transaction 
costs, and may discourage socially worthwhile activity.  See Angela Morrison Uhland, Improving Regulations for 
Biomass-Based Electrical Generating Facilities, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15 (2008).  The more likely and 
more significant the possible enforcement, the more likely indeterminacy will have these effects.   
35
 Giles, supra note __, at 24.  See also Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,517, 
54,521 (proposed Sept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (highlighting the value of “clear regulatory 
requirements” and transparency in promoting water protection).  Certainty can also help the government perform its 
responsibilities more efficiently and effectively.  See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE, CLEAN WATER ACT ACTION PLAN at 4 (2009) [hereinafter, EPA, CWAP] (noting that EPA’s 
“challenges in protecting the nation’s waters have been increased by recent” Supreme Court decisions concerning 
the scope of the Clean Water Act’s coverage because the “substantial confusion and uncertainty arising from those 
decisions” “have negatively impacted EPA’s ability to enforce by significantly increasing the amount of time and 
resources it takes to bring enforcement actions necessary to protect our waters”). 
36
 See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 45, 89 (2012) (citing research that “demonstrates that certainty in statutory or regulatory mandates 
increases the likelihood of compliance”). 
37
 For an interesting case study, see Melissa K. Scanlan & Stephanie Tai, Marginalized Monitoring: Adaptively 
Managing Urban Stormwater, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1  (2013).  See also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & 
Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1998) (urging creation of a “no action” process in which EPA would provide facility-specific 
guidance “so that it gives industry a higher degree of certainty than the EPA’s existing guidance documents and 
policy letters”).  Cf. Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then Some), 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1151, 1156 (2007) (arguing that “the way to achieve a long-term reduction of undesirable activities in 
such gray areas [of health care insurance regulation] is not higher penalties but regulatory clarity – the practice of 
revising incomplete, conflicting, and confusing regulatory guidance to make clear exactly what is expected of the 
provider in the first place”); Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy 
Storage, 41 F.S.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that “not all uncertainty is created equal”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294056.  
38
 See Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 20] (Table 1) (listing five gatekeeper design dimensions). 
39
 See id. at __ [ms at 14-15] (discussing the legislative fidelity critique of private enforcement, which includes the 
risk that private enforcement will yield legislative drift “as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new 
and democratically unaccountable directions”).  
40
 There may be other issues that influence design of gatekeeping structures, such as the desired degree of flexibility 
concerning remedies. 
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for private enforcement.  A recent Colorado compliance initiative involving hazardous waste 
rules found that an innovative state initiative to increase understanding of regulatory 
requirements led to significant improvements in compliance, thereby dramatically reducing the 
need for enforcement by anyone.
41
  These are simply two examples of the many ways in which 
the clarity of regulatory requirements influences the need for enforcement generally, and the 
need for government restraints on private enforcement actions in particular. 
 Second, regulatory designers should consider the implementability of requirements – the 
extent to which strategies “will work in the real world – rules with compliance built in,” as 
EPA’s head of enforcement put it recently.42  For example, in proposing emission control 
regulations for oil and gas producers under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA adopted the strategy 
of allowing producers simply to inform EPA that they are using air pollution control equipment 
that EPA has certified rather than testing the equipment itself.  EPA’s purpose in using this 
approach is to “make compliance easier and less costly, while improving results . . . .”43  As 
students of regulation are well aware, ease of implementation should not always predominate in 
regulatory design, because concerns that norms are inadequate may be a principal impetus for the 
development of more stringent environmental standards and, further, more aggressive 
approaches such as technology-forcing regulation have been used successfully in some 
contexts.
44
  Nevertheless, in developing regulatory approaches policy makers need to be mindful 
of the challenge they are seeking to address and the workability of the strategies they are 
considering.
45
   
                                                             
41
 Joe Schieffelin, et al., Colorado’s Hazardous Waste Small Quantity Generator (SQG) Self-Certification Program 
(April 2013) (on file with the authors). 
42
 Giles, supra note __, at 23.  For arguments in favor of pragmatic regulatory approaches, see SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO 
& ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:  RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (Stanford University 
Press 2003).  There is obviously an overlap between this second attribute and certainty, summarized above. 
43
 Giles, supra note __, at 23.  We do not mean to suggest that self-reporting without any agency oversight would 
necessarily be an optimal strategy.  See, e.g., Schieffelin  et al., supra note __ (noting that self-reporting in tandem 
with agency oversight helped to improve compliance).  
44
 Technology-forcing regulation has long been an accepted and important tool for achieving environmental 
protection goals.  There have been some notable success stories with what some believed to be aspirational 
regulations leading to technological developments that facilitated improved performance, in some cases in the face 
of claims of infeasibility.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (1994); Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate Change:  A 
Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (David M. Driesen ed., The MIT 
Press) (2010); Daniel P. Selmi, Impacts of Air Quality Regulation on Economic Development, 13-Fall NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 382, 386 (1998) (“In the past, claims that the pollution control technology is impossible to 
achieve have collapsed when one manufacturer announced that it was able to comply. “); cf. John P. Dwyer, 
Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995). 
45
 The balance described in the text is relevant to both desired normative outcomes and strategies adopted to achieve 
those outcomes.  Beyond the types of questions referenced in the text, there are entire literatures devoted to the 
appropriate content of regulations.  For a review of economists’ perspectives on regulatory design, see, e.g., Thomas 
P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra 
note __, at 43; Giles, supra note __, at 24 (noting that market strategies “can be simple and effective in the right 
circumstances, reducing costs and providing flexibility for industry while achieving better results”).  For a 
procedural justice perspective, see David Markell, Tom Tyler & Sarah F. Brosnan, What’s Love Got to Do with It?: 
Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-making, 57 VILL. L. REV. 209 (2012).  For a political science 
perspective, see Maria Carmen Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance and Political Science, in 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 69; and for a management scholar perspective, see Andrew 
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This feature of regulatory effectiveness is also relevant to the dynamics of agency 
gatekeeping as a mechanism for rationalizing public and private enforcement.  For example, 
unanticipated regulatory implementation problems may make compliance very costly or not 
possible at all by applicable regulatory deadlines.  Public enforcers might choose to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion and defer prosecution of known violations, perhaps in return for 
commitments by regulated entities to sink resources into developing a fix for the implementation 
problem.  Private enforcement may disrupt such negotiations, interfering with commitments that 
regulated entities might otherwise make to public enforcers.  In such circumstances, the 
arguments in favor of a strong public gatekeeping role for private enforcement actions may be 
relatively appealing. 
 A third key feature of effective regulation and of strategies to induce compliance involves 
what we term “verifiability.”  This includes the capacity to monitor compliance with regulatory 
requirements to promote accountability.  Monitoring schemes come in various shapes and sizes.  
The type of monitoring required may depend on availability of government resources, the 
complexity associated with the monitoring required, the reliability of monitoring equipment, the 
trustworthiness of regulated parties, and the transparency of the information developed and 
provided, among others factors.
46
  Reflecting the variation in approaches that are possible, one of 
us was involved many years ago in establishing a statewide strategy that sought to enhance 
“verifiability” by requiring facilities with especially significant compliance concerns to hire 
independent third-party monitors whose role was to complement both government inspection 
efforts and the facility’s own compliance efforts.47  
The verifiability of regulatory compliance may affect the optimal design of agency 
gatekeeping functions.  For example, the easier and cheaper it is for private enforcers to acquire 
information revealing compliance status, the greater the likelihood that the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
King & Michael W. Toffel, Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving Environmental Problems: Perspectives and 
Contributions from the Management Literature, in id. at 98.  
46
 Monitoring can take several forms, such as the requirement that regulated entities file periodic discharge 
monitoring reports (DMRs), as under the Clean Water Act, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2 (defining DMRs), 122.41(l)(4)(i) 
(requiring filing of such reports), or the obligation for industrial facilities to report annual releases of specified 
chemicals under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.  See U.S. EPA, Toxic Release 
Inventory Program, http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program.  DMRs are compliance-based, while 
chemical release forms are not strictly so but can indirectly provide clues about environmental performance 
generally and compliance in particular.  Verifiability tools vary in their degree of transparency.  Some commentators 
have highlighted the importance of broader transparency to the public as a part of verifiability.  See Markell, Slack, 
supra note __, at 8-10 (discussing increases in transparency and public involvement in the environmental regulatory 
process).  EPA’s view at least is that “[p]ublic disclosure is [an] underutilized tool:  there is powerful evidence that 
publishing information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by customers, 
neighbors, investors, and insurers.” Giles, supra note __, at 24.  A 2008 study in Massachusetts found that “drinking 
water systems required to mail the reports to customers reduced their total violations by 30-44 percent as a result of 
this new reporting, and reduced the more severe health violations by 40-57 percent. . . .  EPA’s efforts to make our 
data more available are only starting to scratch the surface of the ways transparency can improve results.” Id. at 25.  
Further, Giles indicates that transparency may serve a “reminder function”:   “publishing data on facility 
performance draws attention to problems and brings senior-level focus to bear on fixing them.”  Id.  In addition, it 
may bring community pressure to bear on lower performing parties and may alert investors and insurers in ways that 
provide financial motivation to improve performance.   Id. at 25-26.  
47
 See David L. Markell, States and Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in 
the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 408 (1994).    
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overdeterrence that Engstrom describes in discussing another critique of private enforcement, the 
“zealousness critique,” will occur because the expected return will exceed the low cost of private 
enforcement.
48
  In such circumstances, the result may be a deviation between the private and 
social value of enforcement. 
 A fourth attribute of an effective regulatory scheme is its capacity to incentivize regulated 
parties to achieve optimal levels of compliance.  The mix of compliance-inducing tools includes 
strategies intended to deter undesirable behavior as well as approaches that encourage desired 
performance.
49
  The literature often refers to enforcement schemes that provide general as well 
as specific deterrence in order to encourage optimal levels of compliance with the law.
50
  In 
addition, the evolving literature in the management area, among others, suggests that various 
types of “carrots” also have potential to promote compliant behavior.51 
Rationalizing private and public enforcement litigation in order to improve the capacity 
of enforcement actions to deter noncompliance is one of many strategies that falls within this 
fourth attribute or feature of effective regulatory design.
52
  Our expanded focus suggests the 
importance of considering private and public enforcement in the context of other available 
approaches in order to rationalize use of such enforcement.  EPA, for example, may want to 
encourage private enforcement litigation in circumstances in which other forms of inducing 
compliance, such as reliance on positive incentives, do not yield desired levels of compliance 
and in which obstacles (such as resource limits) exist to traditional government deterrence-based 
enforcement.  Similarly, EPA may want to be a strict “gatekeeper” if it is concerned that use of 
private enforcement will undermine national consistency in approaching compliance challenges.   
For example, private party enforcement efforts that focus on securing particular types of relief 
with which EPA has concerns in lieu of the types of relief EPA favors may influence the choice 
                                                             
48
 See Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 10-12].  This critique entails systematic over-expenditure of social 
resources and costly over-deterrence when private enforcers pursue actions that public enforcers choose not to 
pursue because the expected cost exceeds the expected social gain.  The problems associated with the zealousness 
critique arise from deviations in assessments by public and private enforcers of the relative costs and value of 
enforcement.   Id. 
49
 See Lyon, supra note __, at 49-52 (discussing the impacts of various alternative policy instrument choices, such as 
subsidies and effluent fees).  Cf. McGarity, supra note __, at 1207 (arguing that “a carefully selected enforcement 
initiative may accomplish more than a major assistance-based rulemaking initiative”). 
50
 See generally Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __;  Rechtschaffen & Markell, supra note __. 
See also Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness of Government Interventions 
on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 331-36 (2007). 
51
 Lyon, supra note __, at 49-52.  See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __, at 14-29 (discussing 
the potential for positive impacts on compliance from incentive policies); Robert F. Blomquist, Models and 
Metaphors for Encouraging Responsible Private Management of Transboundary Toxic Substances Risk: Toward a 
Theory of International Incentive-Based Environmental Experimentation, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 556 
(1997) (discussing “challenge regulations” which “have the potential to entice and stimulate creative, innovative, 
and cost-effective experimentation by private industrial firms”).  A lot remains to be learned about the effectiveness 
of different strategies.  See, e.g., Simpson et al., supra note __, at. 233 (noting that “scholars and policymakers know 
very little about ‘what works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising’ regarding corporate crime-control strategies”).  
For a recent example of an initiative that dramatically improved compliance rates without any enforcement, see 
Schieffelin, supra note __, at __. 
52
 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 30] (arguing that “an ideal gatekeeper agency focused on optimal 
deterrence will join and leverage the enforcement efforts of overmatched private enforcers who will not otherwise 
fully vindicate the public interest”). 
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of gatekeeping approaches because of not only legislative fidelity, but also coordination issues,
53
 
to use Engstrom’s terms.54 
Finally, we suggest that an important aspect of effective regulation is its capacity to 
promote legitimacy, which we define to include enhancing confidence by the public and others.
55
  
We believe that, in pursuing optimal regulatory design in the compliance arena, it is appropriate 
to ask questions about the effects of different design options on public perceptions.  Will a 
particular regulatory design enhance or diminish public confidence in a regulatory program and 
the government’s ability and willingness to ensure compliance with it?  A regulatory scheme that 
leads to a public perception that government is corrupt, overbearing, or selective may lead to a 
loss of confidence and trust that undermines effective regulation in many ways, including by 
exacerbating budget pressures if public support for necessary funding diminishes.
56
  Similarly, an 
enforcement strategy that relies entirely on regulated entities’ oversight of their own 
performance, without verification or transparency of documentation of regulatory compliance, is 
likely to engender distrust and raise the specter of capture by regulated entities.
57
  Given the 
                                                             
53
 The third critique of private enforcement that Engstrom identifies (in addition to the zealousness and legislative 
fidelity critiques) is what he calls the “coordination critique.”  The problems include wasteful duplication of effort 
and a lack of coherence that disrupts cooperative relationships between regulators and regulatory targets.  Id. __ [ms 
at 12-14]. 
54
 This issue has arisen in the context of supplemental environmental projects (SEPs), among others.  See David L. 
Markell, Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort to Value, Protect, and Restore 
Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. OF ENVTL.& LAND USE  L. 549 (2007). 
55
 For one effort to raise this fifth feature of regulation in a different context, see John H. Knox & David L. Markell, 
Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 47 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 505 (2012).  For discussions of the difficult-to-define concept of legitimacy, see, e.g., Sidney A. 
Shapiro, et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 463, 466 (2012) (noting that “Legitimacy is a notoriously treacherous concept.”).   One way to 
define the term is to focus on “the acceptability of [a] regulation to those involved in its development.”  Jody 
Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 
(2000).  Such acceptability may hinge on the availability of opportunities for public participation and the degree of 
transparency provided by a regulatory scheme.  The legitimacy of a regulatory system also may turn on the degree to 
which it protects against deviation from legislative goals due to capture of regulators by special interests, and on 
whether decision makers are perceived of as honest, unbiased, or competent.  See Camacho & Glicksman, supra 
note __, at ___ (Part I.D).   
56
 The controversy concerning the IRS’s purported selection bias in targeting “tea party” groups is a recent example.  
See Sheila Krumholz & Robert Weinberger, The Real I.R.S. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at A27 (“[E]ven 
more regrettable is the long-term damage to the credibility of the I.R.S. as an impartial arbiter of whether 
organizations merit tax-exempt status.  This will be difficult to undo. . . .”); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Discretion: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 (2013) (raising concerns about 
unfettered prosecutorial discretion). 
57
 See William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 71 (2007) (“EPA enforcement, unfortunately, is quite vulnerable to administrative or political 
manipulation because the level and quality of EPA enforcement activity is not particularly transparent.”).  
Colorado’s recent case study of an initiative that relies on both self-certification and random agency follow-up 
inspections reflects that carefully designed self-certification efforts can dramatically improve compliance.  See 
Schieffelin, supra note __ at, 10, 11, 18 (noting that a self-certification program involving small quantity generators 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act “has attained very impressive compliance rate improvements in 
the SQG universe in Colorado over the last four years,” and reporting that the percent of such facilities in 100% 
compliance with all regulatory requirements increased from 31% in 2008 to 84% in 2011). 
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polling results showing the American public’s loss of confidence in the federal government,58 we 
believe that it is appropriate for those interested in regulatory design to consider this feature of 
effective regulation in considering design options.
59
 
The legitimacy of a regulatory program and the manner in which an agency implements it 
may bear on gatekeeping design choices as well.  Engstrom discusses “bubble periods,” during 
which regulatory mandates remain unsettled, in part because of the costs of complying with 
procedures for adoption of regulatory mandates.
60
  He posits that vigorous private enforcement 
may be troublesome during these transitional periods because judicial responses to private 
enforcement actions may be difficult to override legislatively and enforcement targets may suffer 
costly adverse judgments notwithstanding subsequent overrides.  In such cases, allowing private 
enforcement might undermine legitimacy in the eyes of the regulated community at a minimum.  
This effect would support a strong gatekeeping regime.  But if agency delay in filling statutory 
gaps is due not to the costs of regulation but instead to agency disaffection with the statutory 
regime, private enforcement may help to maintain public confidence in the rule of law.  This 
scenario would seem to favor a weak gatekeeping regime. 
 We conclude this brief introduction to key features of the regulatory process with three 
observations.  First, a key purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that the features or attributes of 
regulatory design are interrelated rather than distinct.
61
  The need for and viability of ex post 
enforcement, and the design of public gatekeeping options (Professor Engstrom’s focus and a 
part of the fourth attribute of effective regulatory compliance structures enumerated above), for 
example, is likely to depend on the clarity of the norms (the first attribute), their 
implementability (the second attribute), the quality of monitoring and dissemination of 
compliance information (the third attribute), and the use of other compliance-promotion tools 
(i.e., other strategies that could be included as part of the 4
th
 attribute).  Thus, it is critical to 
understand the entire regulatory process not only in designing an overall regulatory program 
capable of meeting statutory goals, but also in making informed judgments about narrower 
                                                             
58
 See e.g., Joy Wilke & Frank Newport, Fewer Americans than Ever Trust Government to Handle Problems, 
GALLUP POLITICS, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/164393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-gov-handle-
problems.aspx .  Some individual agencies, including EPA, tend to poll much higher, however.  At the same time 
that only 19% of respondents in one poll answered that they trust the government to do what is right almost always 
or most of the time, and only 23% viewed Congress favorably, 62% of respondents viewed EPA favorably.  Pew 
Research Center, Trust in Government Nears Record Low, but Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably (Oct. 
18, 2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-18-
13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf  
59
 As indicated above, this set of five attributes of effective governance is not intended to be exhaustive or 
comprehensive.  Instead, our intent is to highlight some of the key features of effective regulation.  While we did not 
highlight the need for adequate funding and other resources, as well as stakeholder support, specifically, these also 
are important to governance’s capacity to be effective in advancing objectives.  See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 
__, at 26 (making this point in the context of adaptive management).   
60
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 16]. 
61
 The reference to transparency as an attribute that is relevant to legitimacy, for example, reflects the overlap among 
our categories, as transparency is also often a feature of verifiability. 
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aspects of optimal regulatory design, such as compliance promotion generally or even the 
appropriate regulatory design of government gatekeeping of private enforcement.
62
 
Second, hybrid governance, or “pluralistic regulatory governance,” to use Professor 
Engstrom’s term, is a critical component of the search for effective regulatory compliance 
structures.  As Professor Engstrom highlights, over time private NGOs have taken on an 
increasing role in ex post enforcement of the environmental laws, and this expanded role is likely 
to continue for some time.  This form of hybrid governance, however, is only the tip of the 
iceberg.  A wide range of NGOs today plays critical roles that affect each of the five attributes or 
features of regulatory design we outline above.  For example, involvement of key stakeholders in 
the development of norms can help to produce clarity (characteristic 1 of effective regulation), 
their engagement is essential in considering feasibility (characteristic 2), and verifiability 
(characteristic 3) depends on the engagement of regulated parties but also benefits from public 
involvement.  In short, the search for optimal governance benefits from consideration of options 
for integrating NGOs throughout the regulatory process.
63
  Engstrom implicitly highlights the 
importance of this issue in the search for regulatory design, but it deserves treatment well beyond 
public gatekeeping of private enforcement.  Instead, it is important to consider the implications 
of hybrid governance across the entire regulatory landscape.
64
 
A final point, which is implicit in our preceding summary of the features of effective 
regulation and on which we focus in Part III below, is that the possibilities for optimal 
governance are dynamic, as the capacities of different actors evolve.  For example, advances in 
technology that facilitate better monitoring and data management hold promise for transforming 
governance in ways that overcome some of the more pressing historic and contemporary 
challenges.  EPA is relying on these new tools heavily as it pursues improved regulatory design 
to address the compliance challenges it faces.
65
   
Our purpose in this Part is to support our claim that the search for optimal regulatory 
design requires an understanding of the entire regulatory process and of the actors who play 
critical roles throughout that process, whether the goal is optimal regulatory design for a 
regulatory scheme writ large, or optimal regulatory design of a particular piece of that scheme. 
We now turn to a brief review of some of the real-world compliance-related challenges and 
                                                             
62
 See Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 5 (noting that policy makers continue to wrestle with 
the challenge of “how to balance punishment and deterrence through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive 
approaches, self-auditing or correction, and voluntary compliance”) 
63
 The dynamic nature of “new governance” approaches is important to bear in mind, as the predilections of different 
actors change over time.  See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note __, at ___ (suggesting that the increased role of NGOs in 
governance stems in part from a retreat by government that has created a regulatory vacuum).  Grabosky suggests 
that “regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational interactions between institutions are often complex.”  Id. 
at 116.  Some favor some degree of orchestration of different actors (Engstrom falls into this camp, as do we), while 
others “may see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as inevitable.”  Id. at 115-16. 
64
 Others have highlighted this reality as well and agencies have recognized some of the opportunities.  EPA, for 
example, initiated the “National Report a Violation” website in 2006 in an effort to encourage citizens to report 
potential environmental violations, part of the “verifiability” characteristic we describe above.  Esworthy, How Are 
They Enforced?,  supra note ___, at 14.  See also EPA-OECA, Report on Environmental Violation, 
http://www.epa.gov/tips. 
65
 See infra Part III. 
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opportunities EPA faces, before considering in the final Part some regulatory design options that 
EPA is currently exploring in the context of the strategies that Professor Engstrom discusses.   
II. Contextualizing the Conceptual Framework for Effective Regulatory Compliance Design: 
An Overview of EPA’s Compliance Track Record and Challenges 
 
Professor Engstrom has helpfully expanded the debate about optimal regulatory design of 
the enforcement function beyond assessments of the appropriateness of litigation reforms by 
suggesting the relevance of gatekeeping design options.  In Part I, focusing on the operation of 
EPA, we argued that a broader range of regulatory features is relevant to effective regulation, 
including effective enforcement, and provided examples of how these features are inter-related; 
in particular, we explained how different features may affect gatekeeping design.  In this Part we 
provide additional context by reviewing EPA’s enforcement track record and capacity and 
explain how they relate to the optimal design of compliance approaches generally, and of 
gatekeeping approaches in particular. 
Evaluating effectiveness in inducing compliance is an extraordinarily difficult task.
66
  It 
is worth being mindful of the old adage about optimists seeing the glass half full and pessimists 
seeing the same glass as half empty in considering EPA’s performance and appraisals of its 
enforcement efforts.  Nevertheless, a wide variety of observers, inside and outside government, 
have identified significant concerns over EPA efforts to promote compliance.  EPA faces 
substantial barriers in overcoming these challenges, including resource constraints (its own and 
those of the states), and a changing (in some cases expanding) regulated community.  There are, 
however, some promising signs on the regulatory design horizon as well.   
                                                             
66
 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 5, 40 (noting that “how best to measure the success and 
effectiveness of enforcement” is an issue of continuing interest and that “[f]ully evaluating and measuring the 
overall effectiveness of current (and past) pollution control enforcement and compliance activities can be quite 
complicated”).  EPA acknowledged this reality recently in a draft strategy for improving oversight of state 
enforcement performance.  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Strategy for Improving Oversight of 
State Enforcement Performance 2-3 (Aug. 27, 2013 draft) [hereinafter EPA, Improving Oversight], available at 
http://environblog.jenner.com/files/national-strategy-for-improving-oversight-of-state-enforcement-performance.pdf 
(link provided in Steven M. Siros, EPA Proposes Increased Oversight Of State Enforcement Activities (Oct. 18, 
2013), available at http://environblog.jenner.com/corporate_environmental_l/2013/10/epa-proposes-increased-
oversight-over-state-enforcement-activities.html) (noting that “[m]easuring state [enforcement] performance is a 
complex undertaking” and further noting that EPA’s data alone “cannot tell us what we need to know about 
performance” for a variety of reasons, including because EPA’s current metrics are “based on the activities the states 
perform and not on the level of compliance within regulated sectors, which is difficult to assess with the information 
currently available”).  There is an extensive measurement literature.  The Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA), in its various manifestations, represents an effort to focus on results and their measurement.  See, e.g., 
Office of Management and Budget, Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative and Implementing the 
GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (April 14, 2001), M-11-17, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-17.pdf; Lori S. Bennear & Katherine 
Dickinson, Incorporation Evaluation into the Regulatory Process , Duke Environmental Economics Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper EE 11-06 (July 2011), available at 
http://sites.nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/environmentaleconomics/files/2013/01/WP-EE-11-06.pdf; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides Important 
Opportunities to Address Government Challenges (May 10, 2011, GAO-11-617T), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-617T; Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Performance Accountability: The Five 
Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices, IBM Center for The Business of Government (2006), available at 
http://www.acquisition.gov/sevensteps/library/PerformanceAccountability.pdf. 
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The salient point about the contextual overview we provide in this Part is that extant and 
upcoming challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, demonstrate that efforts to improve 
“regulatory design,” even of particular aspects of regulatory regimes such as gatekeeping 
strategies, should be made with an understanding of the nature of the challenges an agency faces 
and the tools available to meet those challenges.  For example, concerns that a regulatory design 
that enables private enforcement suits will lead to the problems with private enforcement that 
Engstrom discusses (overzealousness, coordination challenges, or infidelity to legislative 
objectives) are likely to be fairly minor in a context in which there is rampant non-compliance, 
violations are causing significant environmental degradation and harm to public health, and 
responsible agencies have proved incapable of or unwilling to enforce even the most egregious 
violations.  On the other hand, such concerns are likely to be much more relevant when 
compliance challenges are complex and require sophisticated, integrated strategies, and a 
responsible agency’s efforts to address these challenges efficiently and effectively are likely to 
be undermined by the presence of a host of other erstwhile enforcers. 
 
 A. Agency Enforcement Records  
 
 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), EPA’s Inspector General, EPA’s 
Administrator, and EPA’s own enforcement office have offered highly critical assessments of 
EPA’s performance in promoting compliance with environmental regulatory requirements.67  In 
a December 2012 report, for example, the GAO noted that “[i]n recent years, EPA has reported 
that it is not achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it expected in 
regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of noncompliance in some programs.
68
 
Compounding the challenge in achieving optimal levels of compliance is the reality that, as the 
GAO also noted, “because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, 
such as the NPDES [permit program under the CWA], EPA cannot determine the full extent of 
entities’ compliance.”69 
 
 Concerns about government enforcement extend beyond EPA’s performance.  An 
essential feature of environmental regulation is its reliance on a cooperative federalism structure.  
Congress has enacted pollution control laws such as the CAA and CWA, charging EPA with 
ultimate responsibility for implementing these laws and achieving their goals.  It has also 
empowered qualified and interested states, however, to take over primary implementation, 
notably planning, permitting, and enforcement, under laws states adopt for that purpose.
 70
   Over 
the years, EPA has authorized increasing numbers of states to take primary responsibility for 
implementation of the major environmental laws, and the states are regarded as the primary 
                                                             
67
 For a recent collection of some of the reviews, see Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note __, at 2-4. 
68
 U.S. General Accountability Office, EPA Should Develop a Strategic Plan for Its New Compliance Initiative, 
GAO-13-115, at 1-2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf [hereinafter GAO, 
Strategic Plan].  
69
 Id. at 1-2.   NPDES is the acronym for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program.  
See infra Part III for additional discussion of concerns about EPA’s enforcement record. 
70
 For a description of cooperative federalism under federal environmental statutes, see generally Robert L. 
Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006). 
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enforcers under the major federal environmental regulatory statutes.
71
  As a result, much of the 
compliance promotion work is now done by the states with oversight from EPA.  According to 
one account, states conduct about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and 
file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions.
72
  Thus, assessments of the 
efficacy of state performance are (or to be plausible must be) at the heart of efforts to evaluate 
government enforcement performance more generally.
73
  
 
 The GAO and EPA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), among others, have documented 
significant deficiencies in states’ performance.74 As the GAO noted in 2012, both it and the OIG 
have reported inconsistencies in state environmental enforcement, and the OIG characterized 
state enforcement programs as “underperforming,” notwithstanding EPA’s efforts to improve 
state performance and oversight consistency.
75
 
 
EPA’s enforcement office also has acknowledged serious deficiencies in state performance.  
In its draft August 2013 National Strategy for Improving Oversight of State Enforcement 
Performance, EPA noted that its reviews of state performance found that “four significant issues 
in particular continue to be “unresolved and recurring,” and to require a focused national effort to 
address them: 
 
 Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and incompleteness in national data systems, 
which make it hard to identify when serious problems exist or to track state actions; 
 Routine failure of states to identify and report significant noncompliance; 
 Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate enforcement actions to return 
violating facilities to compliance, potentially allowing pollution to continue unabated; 
and  
 Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which results in ineffective 
deterrence for noncompliance and an unlevel playing field for companies that do 
comply.
76
   
                                                             
71
 See McAllister, supra note ___, at 21 (“In many regulatory programs, states have the primary responsibility for 
enforcement and are overburdened.“); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 43 (2003) ( “Congress established a 
‘cooperative federalism’ structure that makes EPA ultimately responsible for program delivery while reserving the 
primary front lines implementation role for willing and capable states.”). 
72
 McAllister, supra note __, at 21.  See also Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 11 (“A 
significant proportion of inspections and enforcement actions are conducted by the states.”). 
73
 See Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note __, at 3 (noting that in light of the states’ substantial role 
under federal pollution controls statutes, “state autonomy versus the extent of federal oversight is often at the center 
of debate with regard to environmental enforcement”) . 
74
 See, e.g., Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note __, at 2 n. 5 (collecting sources); U.S. EPA Office 
of Inspector General, EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement, 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/202/20111209-12-P-0113.pdf (2011) [hereinafter OIG, Improve Oversight]; U.S. 
Memorandum, Robert Perciasepe and Cynthia Giles to Arthur Elkins, Inspector General (March 12, 2013); CWAP, 
supra note ___, at __. 
75
 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note __, at 1-2. 
76
 EPA’s reviews, conducted under the agency’s State Review Framework (SRF), are available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/state/srf/index.html (2004-2012).  See also EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note 
__, at 11, 15-16 (identifying limited information and inconsistencies in EPA databases concerning state enforcement 
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The upshot is that, as EPA’s OIG has found, “state enforcement programs frequently do 
not meet national enforcement goals.”77  The Inspector General found that during fiscal years 
2003 to 2009, which was before some of the most significant funding declines described below 
occurred, “performance was low across the board,” with some states performing far below 
average.
78
  For example, EPA established a national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA 
emitters every two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met that goal.  As 
of 2009, EPA set a national goal that states inspect 100% of CWA major permit holders every 
two years, but in 2010, only two states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and 13 
states inspected fewer than 50% of major facilities.
79
  Similarly, only two states met EPA’s target 
for inspections of hazardous waste generators under RCRA, and states averaged inspections at 
only 62% of the targeted number of facilities.
80
  The Inspector General concluded that EPA had 
failed to hold its regional offices accountable for ensuring that states adequately enforce 
environmental laws, and that EPA regions did not consistently intervene to correct state 
deficiencies.
81
   
 
Given these challenges, as well as growing federal and state budget pressures, EPA 
observed that it has become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on its traditional approach of 
inspecting individual entities to increase compliance with the nation’s environmental laws and 
regulations.
82
  EPA recently announced a new initiative—Next Generation Compliance—to 
improve performance by capitalizing on advances in emissions monitoring and information 
technology.
83
  
 
B. Declining Resources 
 
 The adequacy of government resources to promote compliance to optimal levels has been 
a long-standing concern that seems unlikely to be addressed in the near term.  Most of EPA’s 
annual funding comes from discretionary appropriations.  The agency’s funds increased sharply 
in the late 1970s, as EPA began implementing many of the foundational environmental laws 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
and noting that EPA has had enormous difficulties in “accurately and consistently tracking the size of the regulated 
populations”). 
77
 OIG, Improve Oversight, supra note __, at 8 (Dec. 9, 2011). 
78
 Id. at 8. 
79
 Id. at 9. 
80
 Id.  at 10. 
81
 Id. at 11, 15.  Statistics such as the number of enforcement actions brought or the amount of penalty dollars 
recovered in enforcement actions do not necessarily correlate with either levels of environmental protection 
achieved or levels of compliance.  The need for enforcement action may fall, for example, if earlier steps in the 
regulatory process have succeeded in making compliance easier and motivating regulated entities to comply.  
Nevertheless, EPA has acknowledged problems in some states’ records on enforcement of the federal statutes and in 
EPA regional offices’ oversight of these programs. See EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note __, at 2-3 (“EPA’s 
current metrics [for state enforcement activity] are based on the activities the states perform and not on the level of 
compliance within regulated sectors, which is difficult to assess with the information currently available.”). 
82
 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note __, at 1-2.  
83 See Giles, supra note __.   The GAO has reviewed this plan and suggested, among other things, that EPA develop 
a “strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program.”  GAO, 
Strategic Plan, supra note __, at 8.   EPA is in the process of doing so.  Id. at 9. 
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adopted earlier that decade.
84
  Funding dipped in the early 1980s and then leveled off until late in 
that decade, after which it increased fairly regularly until fiscal year 2005.  The enacted budget 
for the agency fell slightly for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 (returning to levels experienced 
during the late 1990s), before reaching a peak of $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2010 and then 
declining to about $8.5 billion in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and a little less in fiscal year 
2013.
85
  Adjusted for inflation, however, EPA’s funding in fiscal year 2009 was slightly lower 
than it was in fiscal year 1978, according to the Congressional Research Service.
86
   
 
The impact of a drop in real funding is magnified by the increase in EPA’s regulatory 
responsibilities that occurred between 1978 and 2009 as a result of the enactment of new 
statutory programs (such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act in 1980
87
 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 
1986
88
) and the expansion of regulatory programs – often in ways that drew many new sources 
within the scope  of those programs – through amendments to RCRA in 1984,89 the CWA in 
1987,
90
 and the CAA in 1990.
91
  In each successive fiscal year since 2009, EPA’s funds have 
fallen.
92
  Further cuts, perhaps very significant ones, seem almost inevitable, at least in the near 
term.
93
  Environmental group spokespersons have characterized budget cuts for EPA as an 
                                                             
84
 EPA’s budget increased from $770 million dollars in fiscal year 1976 to $2.7 billion in fiscal year 1977 to $5.4 
billion in both fiscal years 1978 and 1979.  U.S. EPA, EPA’s Budget and Spending, 
http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.  
85
 U.S. EPA, EPA’s Budget and Spending, http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.  EPA received $14.8 
million in appropriated funds in fiscal year 2009, but about half of that amount took the form of emergency 
supplemental appropriations under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115.  Robert Esworthy et al., Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Appropriations for FY2013, 
Congressional Research Service Report, at 2, 39, 41 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42520.pdf [hereinafter Esworthy et al., Appropriations]. 
86
 Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note __, at 39. 
87
 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
88
 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729 (1986). 
89
 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984). 
90
 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987). 
91
 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990). 
92
 EPA appropriations were $14,855.7 million in FY 2009 (including emergency supplemental appropriations), 
$10,291.9 million in FY 2010, $8,682.1 million in FY 2011, $8,449.4 in FY 2012, and $8.3 billion in FY 2013.  
Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note __, at 41; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2014 Interior and Environment Bill (July 22, 2013),  
http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343384.  EPA’s budget declined by 18% 
from FY 2010 to FY2012, not counting the additional cuts caused by the sequestration in 2013.  Coral Davenport, 
EPA Funding Reductions Have Kneecapped Environmental Enforcement, NAT’L J., Mar. 3, 2013. 
93
 Because of a weak economy, President Obama proposed a further 3.5% cut for the agency in fiscal year 2014.  
Gavin Broady, Obama Budget Would Force EPA To Tighten Its Belt, Law 360 (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/431835/obama-budget-would-force-epa-to-tighten-its-belt.  The House’s Interior 
and Environment Appropriations budget bill, however, went much further, proposing to slash EPA’s annual funding 
from $8.3 billion to $5.5 billion, a 34% reduction.  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2014 Interior and Environment Bill (July 22, 2013), 
http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343384.  A press release issued by the 
House Appropriations Committee explained that “[t]he legislation reflects significant efforts to rein in the EPA – an 
agency that has been rife with governmental overreach, overspending on ineffective and unnecessary programs, and 
costly and questionable regulations.”  Id.  See also Interior Appropriations Bill Limits EPA, Conservation Spending, 
Farm Futures (July 24, 2013), http://farmfutures.com/story-interior-appropriations-bill-limits-epa-conservation-
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indirect way to weaken environmental regulations, likening the situation to “death by a thousand 
cuts.”94  In comparison with recent budget declines, EPA’s staffing has remained relatively 
constant since fiscal year 1992.  EPA’s peak workforce occurred in fiscal year 1999 and had 
declined by 5.5% by fiscal year 2012.
95
  EPA’s declining resource pool presents it with difficult 
choices and has led it to consider significant cuts to some programs.
96
 
   
The federal government has long provided financial assistance in the form of grants and 
loans to assist the states in performing their roles under the federal environmental statutes.  
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2012, annual appropriations for EPA categorical grants to assist 
states in implementing air, water, pesticide, and hazardous substance programs shrunk by about 
$85 million.
97
  The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) has expressed concern about 
reductions in federal funding for state environmental programs.
98
  The federal government is 
well aware of these concerns.
99
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
spending-0-100631-spx_1 (quoting House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers) (“In addition, by holding back 
overly zealous and unnecessary environmental regulations, this bill can have a positive effect on our economy and 
will help encourage job growth.”). 
94
 Phil Taylor & Jason Plautz, House proposed ‘devastating’ cuts to Interior, EPA accounts in fiscal 2014, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, May 22, 2013 (quoting Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch). 
95
 Esworthy et al,, Appropriations, supra note __, at 20 (noting that there has been a general downward trend in 
FTEs since FY 2001); U.S. EPA, EPA’s Budget and Spending, http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.  The 
House’s fiscal year 2014 appropriations bill would have capped EPA employees at 1992 levels, which were 
essentially the same as the size of the workforce in 2012.  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2014 Interior and Environment Bill (July 22, 
2013), http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343384.  For graphic depictions of 
EPA’s budget and full-time equivalent staffing levels over the years, see U.S. EPA FY 2014 Budget in Brief, at 13, 
available at  http://www.radonleaders.org/sites/default/files/EPA_FY_2014.pdf.  
The size of the workforce as a whole does not necessarily tell the complete story.  The GAO has criticized 
EPA on the ground that it has “struggled for years to identify its human resource needs and to deploy its staff 
throughout the agency in a manner that would do the most good.”  U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Management Challenges and Budget Observations, GAO-12-149T, at 3 (2011).  
See also EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs Better Agency-Wide Controls over Staff Resources, Report 
No. 11-P-0136 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/20110222-11-P-0136.pdf; EPA 
Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs Workload Data to Better Justify Future Workforce Levels, Report No. 11-P-
0639 (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/201110914-11-P-0630.pdf. 
96
 See EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance—Areas of Proposed Budget Adjustment for FY13 
(available through a link provided in Joel Mintz, Cutting EPA's Enforcement Budget: What It Might Mean (Apr. 12, 
2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6A2E941-98B3-8007-9CEEB42458BED78E).  
This source indicates that EPA’s Office of Enforcement Compliance and Assurance (OECA) responded to the fiscal 
year 2013 budget by proposing “disinvestment” in areas such as acid rain control and reduced enforcement of a 
variety of regulatory programs.   
97
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Funding for 10 States’ Programs Supported by Environmental 
Protection Agency Categorical Grants, GAO-13-504R, at 1 (May 6, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-
504r [hereinafter GAO, Funding for 10].  Appropriations for all EPA categorical grants decreased from a $1.17 
billion in fiscal year 2004 to $1.09 billion in fiscal year 2012.  Id. at 4.  For a graph plotting the amounts provided 
during this period, see id. at 5. 
98
 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 4 (citing ECOS, March 2008 Green Report: State 
Environmental Expenditures 2005-2008, March 12, 2008, available at http://www.ecos.org/section/states/spending). 
99
 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 4 (noting that the “the level of federal funding allocated to 
state and tribes to support effective enforcement of federal pollution control laws has . . . been a long-standing 
congressional concern”).  It is often difficult to follow the money trail, given that “[d]etailed reporting of federal 
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The reductions in federal financial support for the states were especially problematic 
given that many states were cutting funds for their own environmental agencies and enforcement 
programs at the same time.  ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 reports that reductions in state 
budgets for environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state enforcement programs.
100
  
Between fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 24 states reduced funding for their environmental 
agencies,
101
 reflecting “an overall trend of decreasing budgets” for funding for state 
environmental agencies and, according to ECOS, “jeopardize[ing] states’ ability to implement 
federally delegated programs and policies.”102  The CRS expressed concern about a mismatch 
between federal support provided and state needs, noting that “[t]he adequacy of federal funds to 
assist states with these responsibilities has become a more contentious issue over time, as state 
revenues and spending generally have declined under recent economic conditions.”103  The GAO 
similarly noted that “the importance of federal grants has increased, as some states have reduced 
their funding for certain environmental programs to address decreased state revenues and 
significant deficits in funding.”104 
 
Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental programs by reducing staff 
levels and cutting outreach and technical assistance programs that can facilitate compliance.
105
  
State environmental officials have reported to the GAO that resource constraints have required 
them to institute hiring freezes and reduce staff through attrition and layoffs.  In addition, these 
officials reported that funding freezes or declines have affected their capacity to conduct 
activities such as permitting, inspections, and monitoring, all of which are critical to effective 
enforcement.
106
 
 
C. Changes in the Regulated Community and Regulator Responsibilities and 
Capacities: The Dynamic Character of Regulation 
 
 At the same time as resources available to agencies to enforce environmental laws have 
diminished, challenges facing enforcement officials have shifted as well.  Among the factors that 
have made effective enforcement more daunting for some agencies and programs are an increase 
in the number of regulated entities; increases in regulations and mandates; implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
funding to states and states’ funding contributions for pollution control enforcement/compliance activities is not 
readily available.”  Id. at 39. 
100
 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 4 (citing ECOS, Status of State Environmental Agency 
Budgets, 2009-2011, August 2010; ECOS, Impacts of Reductions in FY 2010 on State Environmental Agency 
Budgets, March 2010; ECOS, Funding Environmental Protection: State Budget Shortfalls and Ideas for Mitigating 
Them (June 2009), http://www.ecos.org/section/publications). 
101
 ECOS Green Report - Status of State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2011-2013, at 1 (Sept. 2012), 
http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/41680992/September%202012%20Green%20Report.pdf.  The 24 states with 
decreasing budgets experienced larger changes than the 25 states with increasing budgets, and the total decline in 
state environmental agency budgets from FY2011 to FY2012 averaged $357,015 per state.  Id. 
102
 Id. at 2, 5. 
103
 Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note ___, at 1. 
104
GAO, Funding for 10, supra note ___, at 1. 
105
Id. at 4, 9.  On the potential value of technical assistance and outreach by regulators, see Carol Foley & Michael 
Elliott, Systems Design and the Promotion of Pollution Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance 
Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 449 (1995). 
106
 GAO, Funding for 10, supra note ___, at 4, 9-10.  
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programs that depend on making difficult causal connections between regulated activities and 
environmental harms; a movement in some contexts away from uniform regulatory treatment 
toward differentiated responsibility, which may arise under market-based or ambient-based 
approaches to regulation or other deviations from traditional regulatory tools; and a commitment 
to target significant violations whether by larger or  smaller sources.
 107
 
 
For various reasons, contemporary government enforcement officials would face 
significant challenges in achieving effective enforcement of environmental laws even if the 
financial resources available for enforcement were not declining.  In some instances, the size of 
the regulated community has grown.
108
  EPA has referred to the “breadth and expanding scope of 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) regulated universe” as one of the 
challenges it faces in improving its enforcement performance.
109
  The number of point sources 
subject to CWA permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year period.
110
  A recent 
appellate court decision established, for example, that pesticide applications that allow chemical 
residues to enter surface water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute.
111
  Stormwater 
permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community.
112
  The resulting increase in 
permittees may present difficulties for federal and state regulators.
113
  In New York, regulated 
point sources increased by 63% between 1999 and 2012.
114
  In some of these contexts, it may be 
possible to reduce the burdens of regulating these sources through the creation of general 
permits, such as the ones available under both the CWA’s dredge and fill115 and NPDES116 
permit programs.  Indeed, EPA has developed a general permit for pesticide and herbicide 
applications over surface waters.
117
  General permits undoubtedly reduce the resource 
                                                             
107
 Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note ___ at 4 (noting that the GAO had reported that funding for 
enforcement “had not kept pace with the increasing number of mandates and regulations, or with inflation”). 
108
 See, e.g., Bruce Harper, Trust But Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring as a Response to the 
Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 614 (1996) (“An increase in the number of 
generators alone holds some potential to make environmental enforcement more difficult.”). 
109
 CWAP, supra note __, at 10. 
110
 McAllister, supra note __, at 21-22.  For further discussion of the expansion of the range of regulated sources 
under the Act, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussion of EPA’s 2009 CWAP). 
111
 See National Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6
th
 Cir. 2009). 
112
 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, Limited Knowledge of the Universe of Regulated Entities 
Impedes EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes in Regulatory Compliance, Report No. 2005-P-00024, at 7 (Sept. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf (identifying 45% increase 
in universe of sources requiring stormwater permits under the CWA between 2001 and 2005).  During the same 
period, the number of manufacturers covered by the Toxic Substances Control Act increased by 61%.  Id. 
113
 See Kara Cook, Note, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA Should Use a Watershed-Based 
Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 486 (2010) (“There are significant 
monitoring and enforcement challenges because of the sudden explosion in permitting applicants.”). 
114
 Environmental Advocates of New York, Turning a Blind Eye to Illegal Pollution: DEC’s Failing Record on 
Enforcing Environmental Laws 8 (Sept. 2013), http://www.eany.org/our-work/reports/turning-blind-eye-illegal-
pollution-september-2013. 
115
 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). 
116
 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a) (authorizing the use of general permits in lieu of individualized NPDES permits); 
California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 728 F.3d 868 (9
th
 Cir. 2013) (involving 
California’s Industrial Activities Storm Water General Permit).  See general Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: 
NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 (2007). 
117
 See, e.g., Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General Permit for Point 
Source Discharges From the Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011).  See also Determination 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF 
AUTHORS 
 
24 
 
commitment a state must make at the permit approval stage, but agencies continue to have at 
least some ongoing responsibility for monitoring, oversight of reporting, and inspections.
118
  If 
agencies seek to reduce their administrative burdens by not only switching from source-specific 
to general permitting, but also by minimizing oversight of sources covered by general permits 
through reduced inspections or sporadic review of regulated entities’ reports, one trade-off will 
be a decline in verifiability and accountability. 
 
Efforts to enforce against private landowners, small businesses, or sectors of the business 
community (such as agriculture) that traditionally have not been enforcement targets also may 
pose new challenges, such as increased political opposition.  Efforts to enforce wetlands 
permitting requirements under the CWA, for example, have generated intense political 
opposition and adverse publicity for the federal government.
119
   
 
Changes in the nature of regulatory approaches also may exacerbate efforts to induce 
optimal levels of compliance.  In recent years, for example, EPA has begun to shift its focus in 
implementing the CWA from enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations applicable to 
point sources to achieving state water quality standards through the implementation of ambient 
quality-based effluent limitations.
120
  Water quality standards are often expressed in terms of 
maximum ambient concentrations of pollutants in a surface water body.  Implementation of such 
a standard requires a state environmental agency to establish a total maximum daily load 
(TMDL), which is an aggregate amount of pollution that may be discharged into a surface water 
body without resulting in concentrations of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a 
state water quality standard.
121
  Establishing enforceable limits, monitoring whether allowed 
loadings (clearly enforceable or less so) are producing desired environmental results, and 
adapting to the findings are all resource-intensive enterprises.
122  
Determining whether a point 
source violated technology-based effluent limits, which are expressed as caps on end-of-pipe 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Endangered Species Status for Six West Texas Aquatic Invertebrates, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,228 (July 9, 2013) 
(describing Texas general permit program). 
118
 See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,775 (listing among the Pesticide General Permit requirements the duties of 
applicators to monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring activities).  General permits under the 
NPDES permit program may regulate one or more categories of discharges, provided that all sources within a 
category are subject to the same or similar monitoring requirements.  40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D). 
119
 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Wetlands? What Wetlands?, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/wetlands-
what-wetlands/?_r=0 (Apr. 20, 2011) (describing the background of Sackett v. EPA. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), a case 
concerning CWA enforcement action to block construction of a single family home on property alleged to contain 
regulated wetlands, as an example of the view of libertarians and tea party members that EPA  is the “embodiment 
of government run amok”). 
120
 See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note ___, at 614 (noting recent increase in the role of water quality standards 
and likely greater future reliance on those standards). 
121
 Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1
st
 Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C)) (“A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum quantity of a pollutant that may be added to a water 
body from all sources without exceeding applicable water quality standards including ‘a margin of safety which 
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water 
quality’”). 
122
 It is difficult to overstate the complexity associated with the regulatory and non-regulatory enterprise of seeking 
to bring an impaired water up to a desired state.  Cf. Sarah Birkeland, EPA’s TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
297, 300 (2001) (referring to “the implementation and enforcement challenges faced by the EPA’s TMDL 
program”). 
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discharges, is a relatively simple matter by comparison. Agency efforts to improve water quality 
by restoring and maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create similar ripple 
effects on enforcement strategies.
123
  As regulatory challenges change, so do enforcement 
challenges, affecting optimal regulatory design of enforcement regimes, including agency 
gatekeeping of private enforcement. 
 
Shifting from traditional regulatory techniques such as technology-based limits that apply 
to classes of regulated sources to market-based strategies that allow individual regulated entities 
to alter their responsibilities through inter-source transactions is another change in regulatory 
approach that is likely to create new enforcement challenges.
124
  Such a shift may make it more 
difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of individual regulated 
entities.
125
  Some emissions trading markets have been exploited through the sale of credits for 
environmental improvements that would have occurred even without regulation, credits for 
which sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another market, or credits that 
did not occur at all except on paper.
126
  Colorado noted that the burden on agencies to improve 
compliance may increase when requirements are tailored rather than consistent across an 
industry, not only because it will be more difficult for government inspectors to determine 
compliance, but also because “it may be more difficult to implement a self-certification program 
where individualized permits determine unique facility-specific compliance requirements.”127 
 
A final development that may increase the difficulty of enforcement for public and 
private enforcers is the effort to address significant environmental threats, even from sources that 
have not traditionally been the focus of agency enforcement attention, and to address sources that 
are emitting or discharging relatively small amounts, but whose violations may be cumulatively 
                                                             
123
 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 550 (describing new objectives geared toward restoration and maintenance 
of functioning ecosystems and toward control of nonpoint source pollution). 
124
 U.S. environmental law has long been criticized for excessive reliance on traditional regulatory techniques such 
as uniform technology-based standards applicable to categories of regulated sources.  The critics contend, among 
other things, that such approaches are inefficient because they fail to recognize differences among sources in the 
costs of controlling pollution.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).  Policymakers have responded by incorporating market-based mechanisms such as 
tradeable permits into statutes such as the CAA.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7651b(b) (allowing purchase and sale of 
allowances for regulated utilities to emit sulfur dioxide under the Act’s acid deposition control program). 
125
 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006) (“The environmental experience shows that it is easier to keep 
track of a uniform technology than to police facility-specific pollution reduction strategies.  Second generation 
strategies encourage differentiation.  They accordingly offer less in the way of strict accountability and 
enforceability and open the door to bad-faith attempts to game the system.”). 
126
 See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland 
and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 291-92 (2012).  For descriptions of 
these kinds of exploitations of environmental regulatory markets, see Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution 
Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 231 (1999); Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a 
Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-
change-drives-output-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  See also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools for 
Environmental Justice: Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203 (2001). 
127
 Schieffelin, supra note __, at 18. 
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significant.
128
  If enforcement initiatives target smaller sources, enforcers may have to initiate 
more actions and commit more resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of 
environmental improvement through enhanced compliance.
129
 In addition, data relevant to 
compliance status may not be available to the same extent for small as for larger sources, making 
it more difficult to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive as agencies must 
amass a data base that does not exist or is incomplete.
130
   
 
Changes in regulatory challenges are not entirely in the direction of making government 
officials’ jobs more difficult.  There are also opportunities to promote compliance that may 
facilitate better performance.   As Part III below indicates, these include improvements in 
monitoring capacity and enhancements in the capacity to manage and disseminate data and other 
information.  Improved understanding of the mix of incentives that promote compliance also 
holds promise for improving the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.
131
 
 
D. A Brief Conclusion Concerning the Importance of Context to Regulatory Design 
  
 Professor Engstrom’s analysis focuses on rationalization and optimization of enforcement 
through coordination of private and public enforcement litigation.  He identifies three kinds of 
problems posed by a regime that relies in part on private enforcement – what he refers to as 
zealousness,
132
 coordination,
133
 and democratic accountability challenges.
134
  He then asks 
whether vesting agencies with “gatekeeping” powers over private enforcement is a more 
promising approach to rationalizing public and private enforcement than litigation reforms of the 
kind that have been suggested or adopted in recent years.  Legislation or judicial decisions that 
expand or narrow the circumstances in which prevailing parties in federal court litigation may 
recover attorneys’ fees135 or that impose more rigorous pleading requirements on litigants136 
                                                             
128
 Cf. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, Limited Knowledge of the Universe of 
Regulated Entities Impedes EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes in Regulatory Compliance, Report No. 2005-P-
00024, at 14 (Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf 
[hereinafter OIG, Limited Knowledge] (reporting that, in multiple program areas, “OECA does not know the 
cumulative effects of pollution from small entities”).  The OIG also reported that “some states and EPA regions have 
argued that RCRA small quantity generator facility inspections represent some of the most environmentally 
significant activities that regions and States conduct.”  Id.  See also infra Part III. 
129
 Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 560 
(“The remaining non-compliance cases often involve either smaller targets or more difficult problems of proof, 
making them costlier and riskier to litigate.”). 
130
 See, e.g., OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note ___, at 8 (discussing absence of reliable data on programs such as 
CAA regulation of minor stationary sources and regulation of small quantity generators under RCRA). 
131
 See infra Part III. 
132
 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
133
 The coordination problem arises from “wasteful duplication of effort and socially costly overdeterrence by 
‘piggybacking’ on public enforcement efforts and also on each other.”  Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 12]; 
supra note __ and accompanying text. 
134
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 7]; supra note __ and accompanying text. 
135
 See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 
(2011) (rejecting catalyst theory for determining eligibility for fee-shifting provisions under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act).  See generally Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in 
Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2004); Catherine R. 
Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for 
the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007) (assessing the impact of Buckhannon). 
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certainly may affect the willingness of private litigants to bring enforcement actions.  It is 
appropriate and important to compare the relative merits of these kinds of reforms and agency 
gatekeeping mechanisms of the kind Professor Engstrom analyzes, as Engstrom does. 
 
In crafting an approach to rationalizing public and private enforcement, however, 
policymakers and students of the environmental regulatory process should be aware that 
developments throughout that process also significantly impact both public and private 
enforcement efforts, and therefore affect the value of a gatekeeping approach to addressing the 
critiques of private enforcement.  As Part I above indicates, regulatory design efforts will benefit 
from understanding the  relationships among five key characteristics of regulation, even in 
circumstances in which such efforts focus on a particular aspect of regulation, such as agency 
gatekeeping of private enforcement.  Part II demonstrates that policymakers engaged in 
regulatory design also should consider a different set of contextual realities:  the actual record of 
the agency involved, its capacity to fulfill statutory duties, and the dynamic character of the 
challenges facing agencies and the opportunities available to them in addressing those 
challenges.  The overarching point is that regulatory design, even of public gatekeeping 
mechanisms for private enforcement, needs to be undertaken with a sophisticated understanding 
of the nature of the compliance promotion landscape that exists in a particular regulatory setting 
and of the changes in this landscape that are likely to occur over time. 
 
III. Promoting Compliance throughout the Regulatory Process: A Review of EPA’s Initiative 
to “Transform” Compliance and Enforcement under the Clean Water Act137 
In this Part we return full circle to Professor Engstrom’s original claim – that 
rationalization of the increasing volume of private enforcement litigation with government 
enforcement poses a central challenge in the modern regulatory state.  We do so by exploring 
what degree of importance EPA seems to have attached to this challenge as it grapples with how 
best to reinvent its compliance promotion strategies under the CWA.  It is not our objective to 
empirically evaluate Professor Engstrom’s claim or to refute the relevance of the interplay 
between public and private enforcers to efforts to promote effective regulation.  Instead, we 
simply seek to explore the extent to which one of the agencies on which Engstrom focuses, EPA, 
shares his perspective.  As the description of EPA’s recent compliance promotion efforts in this 
Part indicates, EPA does not appear to regard rationalization of public and private enforcement 
as either the essential challenge facing its compliance promotion efforts or as a priority to 
fostering increased compliance in the future.  The agency’s analysis of this feature of regulatory 
design is conspicuous by its absence.  Rather, EPA’s CWA strategies provide examples that 
support our claim that regulatory design in general, and design of compliance promotion 
mechanisms in particular, turn on a series of factors that reflect the multi-faceted, hybrid, and 
dynamic character of the regulatory process.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
136
 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Altantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Arthur 
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1, 15-16 (2010) (assessing the impact of Iqbal and Twombly). 
137
 Transform is EPA’s word.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Administrator Jackson on Improving Water Quality 
Transparency and Effective Enforcement of Clean Water Act Requirements (July 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html. 
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Over the past five years EPA has acknowledged that its strategies for promoting 
compliance with the CWA, a statute that has been in place since 1972,
 138
 need improvement.
139
  
In Professor Engstrom’s parlance, EPA’s statements reflect its awareness that its regulatory 
design of compliance efforts is not optimal.  In a July 2009 Memorandum, EPA Administrator 
Lisa Jackson told the head of EPA’s enforcement program, Cynthia Giles, that “[w]e are . . . 
falling short [in] the effectiveness of our clean water enforcement programs,”140 and “the level of 
significant non-compliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably high . . . .”141  Jackson 
accordingly directed Giles to develop an action plan to improve enforcement performance.   
A few months later, in October 2009, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assistance (OECA) issued the Agency’s Clean Water Action Plan.142  Echoing the 
Administrator’s concerns, OECA noted that “[v]iolations are . . . too widespread, and 
enforcement too uneven.”143  OECA also emphasized the challenge presented by a substantially 
increased universe of regulated parties:  “[t]he sheer magnitude of the expanding universe of the 
NPDES program itself, from roughly 100,000 . . . sources to nearly a million sources . . . presents 
challenges in how we regulate and enforce the laws. . . .”144  EPA noted that the types of sources 
known to raise concerns has evolved as well:  when EPA developed its enforcement policies, it 
focused primarily on the largest (or major) facilities with individual permits that are in 
significant noncompliance, but it found a rate of serious noncompliance at about 45 percent of 
smaller facilities.
145
  According to the CWAP, “[w]ithout complete and accurate data, it is hard 
to know how critical the noncompliance at smaller facilities is to water quality.  It is likely that 
these smaller but more numerous sources are of critical concern, especially where there are 
                                                             
138
 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
139
 Concerns pre-dated this latest EPA call for improvements.  See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra 
note __; RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note __.  Generally, the CWA requires thousands of entities across the 
country to obtain individual or general permits that allow them to discharge water pollution.  Compliance-related 
efforts have focused on optimizing compliance with these permit requirements.  One of the primary strategies EPA 
has used is enforcement litigation against parties operating in “significant non-compliance” with permit obligations.  
See, e.g., EPA Office of Compliance and Enforcement Assurance, EPA's Interim Significant Noncompliance Policy 
for Clean Water Act Violations Associated with CSOs, SSOs, CAFOs, and Storm Water Point Sources (Oct. 2007), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/state/srf/sncpolicy-attach1.pdf. 
140
 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson on Improving Water Quality Transparency and Effective Enforcement 
of Clean Water Act Requirements (July 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html.  See also CWAP, supra 
note __, at 2 (“Unfortunately, data shows us that we are not getting the compliance envisioned by our laws to protect 
clean water.”); id. at 3 (“State enforcement response to serious violations, whether at large or smaller facilities, is 
not what it should be.”).  The memo adds that: 1) traditionally EPA has focused more on large, “major” facilities 
than others; 2) it has not even required states to submit data about smaller facilities to EPA; and 3) therefore, that 
whereas EPA does not know the percentage of smaller sources nationally that are in significant compliance, 
compared to the rate for major facilities.   But for the 28 states, 4 territories, and D.C., which have provided some of 
these data, the rate of significant noncompliance at smaller facilities is around 45 percent, nearly twice the rate for 
major facilities.  The Plan concludes that “EPA and states need consistent, national data to be able to formulate 
appropriate strategies for ensuring compliance from these facilities, and to target enforcement resources to the 
sources most affecting water quality.”  Id. at 3. 
141
 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson, supra note ___. 
142
 CWAP, supra note __. 
143
 Id. at Executive Summary. 
144
 Id. at 1, 12 (noting that EPA’s CWA-based permitting and enforcement program has “expanded its regulated 
universe more than tenfold”). 
145
 Id. at 3. 
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clusters of permitted facilities around impaired waters.”146  OECA stated that EPA needed to 
“revamp” enforcement to meet these challenges.147  Based on its own assessment, and 
considerable outreach,
148
 OECA identified “three major themes for action” to improve 
compliance, noting that its outreach efforts engendered a “surprising coalescence” around these 
themes.
149
  The three themes, discussed below, are the need to focus on the most significant 
threats, to strengthen EPA-state partnerships and improve the performance of each partner, and 
to improve accountability and transparency. 
 
A. The Need to Focus Enforcement on the Most Significant Threats 
The first theme for action identified in the CWAP is the need to focus enforcement on the 
“biggest threats to water quality and public health.”150  This strategy (or approach to regulatory 
design) might seem obvious.  But as EPA points out, an unintended consequence of EPA’s 
traditional regulatory design, which was to focus on the biggest facilities (known in EPA 
parlance as “majors”) was that EPA paid little attention to the “full range of the NPDES 
regulated universe,”151 including “non-major” sources whose discharges caused significant 
environmental problems.   
EPA identified a range of “new approaches and new tools” to address its proposed shift 
in enforcement strategy.
152
  For example, EPA noted its need to improve its data management in 
order to be able to understand the relationship between compliance problems and their impacts 
                                                             
146
 Id.  Professor Dick Pierce recognized decades ago that “[s]mall firms do not produce disproportionate quantities 
of social ‘goods.’  They do produce massively disproportionate quantities of social ‘bads.’”  Richard J. Pierce, Small 
Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 539 
(1986).  See also id. at 557 (“small firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the social bads that we attempt to 
reduce through regulation.”); id. at 559 (“Small firms also are responsible for a massively disproportionate share of 
water and air pollution.”).  Professor Pierce was addressing small firms, not necessarily small facilities, but EPA’s 
assessment in the CWAP indicates that similar conclusions may apply to small sources, especially when assessing 
the aggregate impacts of their discharges. 
147
Id. at Executive Summary, 5.  EPA noted that some water quality problems are caused by sources not currently 
being regulated.  Id. at 6.  Our focus, like Prof. Engstrom’s, is on optimal regulatory design in the compliance arena; 
we do not address the need to revisit the scope of underlying regulatory schemes (such as by covering nonpoint 
sources currently exempt from most CWA regulation).   
148
 Outreach included solicitation of input from academics, industry, and environmental and environmental justice 
NGOs, among others.  Id. at 5. 
149
 Id. at 6.  Since issuing its Plan in 2009, EPA has followed through in various ways.  See, e.g., Memorandum from 
Cynthia Giles & Peter Silva on Interim Guidance to Strengthen Performance in the NPDES Program (June 22, 
2010), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/interim-guidance-strengthen-performance-npdes-program.  
See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, 
CWA ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PRIORITIES: CHANGES TO IMPROVE WATER QUALITY, INCREASE COMPLIANCE 
AND EXPAND TRANSPARENCY (2011) [hereinafter INCREASED COMPLIANCE], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/civil/programs/cwa/actionplan-implpriorities.pdf. 
150
 CWAP, supra note ___, at 6. 
151
 Id.   
152
 Id. at 7.   EPA discussed several of the new tools it has developed in a 2011 memorandum, INCREASED 
COMPLIANCE, supra note ___. 
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on water quality.
153
  Data about water quality, permit limits, and permit violations “reside in 
different systems and have not been routinely used together to help target serious problems.”154  
Second, EPA highlighted the importance of improving tools across the spectrum of regulation, 
indicating that while responses might include enforcement actions, addressing water quality 
concerns also might require fixing problematic regulations and improving operating permits.
155
 
Third, the agency focused on integrating its “state partners” better in its discussion about options 
for addressing the “biggest threats.”156 
In short, EPA’s strategy in addressing the first significant deficiency it identified in extant 
compliance promotion efforts involved several of the key elements of a conceptual framework 
for regulatory design that we introduced in the introduction to this Essay.  First, EPA’s strategy 
acknowledged the inter-related character of the regulatory process and the need to consider 
actions, including improvements in its regulations, the operation of the CWA’s permitting 
regime, and its management of data throughout the process to improve compliance (our first 
characteristic).  Second, EPA’s goal of better integrating states into its enforcement initiatives 
reflects the hybrid nature of the regulatory process.  Third, the agency’s decision to refocus its 
efforts was based on the “reality check” that historically it was giving insufficient attention to 
significant violators by focusing on a small subset of the regulated party universe.  Fourth, 
EPA’s commitment to take advantage of improved technology to make “timely, easily accessible 
and understandable information available to the public concerning violations/violators, actions 
EPA and states are taking to address them, and the effects of our actions on water quality”157 
relates to our first characteristic (inter-relatedness) and our fourth (dynamism).  
B. Strengthening the State/EPA Partnership and the Performance of Each 
The second “major theme for action” that EPA identified in its CWAP, not entirely 
distinct from the first, is the need to strengthen the performance of the states, the key 
implementers of the CWA.  States play an indispensable implementation role within cooperative 
federalism systems, the governance model (regulatory design) Congress adopted in the major 
environmental laws.
158
  The Plan notes that reviews of state performance have identified 
widespread deficiencies, and EPA has identified the importance of federal oversight to motivate 
improvements in such performance:  
                                                             
153
 Id. (noting that “[o]nce we have identified significant point source violations across the spectrum of regulated 
facilities that adversely affect water quality, we will work with state programs to commence appropriate federal and 
state civil and criminal enforcement actions.”) 
154
 Id.  
155
 Id. 
156
Id.  For example, OECA has recently indicated that it is receptive to allowing states to scale back inspections and 
monitoring at large facilities to free up resources for more intensive scrutiny at smaller facilities, at which 
compliance rates are lower.  Reflecting the complexity of the cooperative federalism approach, however, another 
recent report indicates that while states are ready to refocus their efforts, some of EPA’s regional offices have 
expressed less willingness to go along with shifting enforcement-related resources from large facilities to higher 
priority smaller ones.  See EPA Plan for Flexible Compliance Monitoring May Fall Short of States’ Goal, ENVTL. 
POLICY ALERT/INSIDE EPA (Oct. 2, 2013), at 33 (noting that  “some state officials said EPA regional officials do not 
appear open to . . . scaling back resource-intensive inspections at large facilities with typically good compliance 
records in exchange for more inspections at smaller, less-reviewed plants”). 
157
 CWAP, supra note __, at 7. 
158
 Forty-six states are currently authorized to implement the CWA NPDES program.  Id. at 8. 
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[The many reviews of state permitting and enforcement performance] have identified a 
lack of consistency in performance across states and highlighted common issues such as 
permit backlogs, failure to identify significant noncompliance, or to take timely and 
appropriate enforcement.  EPA must consistently respond to these issues and press states 
and ourselves to make the appropriate improvements in order to achieve equitable 
protection to the public, a level playing field for competing businesses, and fairness 
across states in how our environmental laws are enforced.
159
 
This EPA priority is consistent with Professor Engstrom’s insight that “rationalization” of 
the work and responsibilities of different actors is a central challenge of governance, but EPA’s 
focus is on a different piece of the hybrid governance conundrum, and it is consistent with our 
point (the second of our key conceptual elements of regulatory design) that design efforts must 
be cognizant of the roles of all stakeholders in a hybrid regulatory process.  Particularly in the 
cooperative federalism context built into the environmental statutes, it is unsurprising that EPA 
would make rationalization of its relationship with the states a top priority.
160
  As we have 
pointed out elsewhere,
161
 EPA exercises ex ante gatekeeping and ex post oversight of state 
enforcement and one of its long-standing challenges is to rationalize its relationship with the 
states.   The availability of citizen suits complicates this rationalization challenge because such 
suits make it possible for three enforcers with different interests and capacities to be concerned 
about particular alleged violators.  EPA, in short, ideally will consider private party, state, and 
federal capacities and pathologies in pursuing rationalization of the enforcement action among 
all three sets of actors.  Professor Engstrom builds on past work addressing pieces of this 
challenge.
162
  Hybrid governance challenges and opportunities need to be addressed through 
better integration of state actors as well as NGOs throughout the regulatory process. 
EPA’s focus in the CWAP on rationalizing federal and state enforcement efforts reflects 
not only our point about the importance of hybrid governance considerations to regulatory 
                                                             
159
 Id.  These concerns are not new.  One observer, for example, rendered the following assessment 20 years ago:  
“Enforcement of environmental laws by the EPA and the authorized states, however, has largely been an 
uncoordinated, piecemeal effort.  Individual EPA offices and their state counterparts have generally functioned 
independently. . . . The insularity of the EPA’s separate offices and their state-level counterparts has at times 
resulted in duplicate and conflicting actions.”  Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimideia Enforcement Strategy: The 
Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (1993).  For book-length 
treatment, see RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note __.  See also Markell, Slack, supra note __, at 8-10.  For a 
recent review of an innovative process intended to empower citizens to raise such concerns administratively, see 
Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the 
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.  313(2013). 
160
 See, e.g., Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 285 (2011) (discussing cooperative federalism’s potential to “create coordinated multiscalar 
action in which each actor provides its unique contribution”); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and 
Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (2005) (referring to coordination between federal and state 
entities as “an irreducible aspect”  of cooperative federalism); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative 
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001).   
161
 Hammond & Markell, supra note __, at ___. 
162
 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental 
Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: Statutory Bars and in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (2004); Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive 
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA Enforcement, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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design, but other conceptual elements as well.  EPA’s identification of deficiencies in state 
performance at different stages of the regulatory process relates to our first element (the inter-
relationship of the different phases of the regulatory process).  The agency’s apparent decision to 
regard rationalization of federal and state enforcement as a higher priority than the 
rationalization of public and private enforcement that is the subject of Professor Engstrom’s 
analysis relates to our fifth element (salience).
163
  To the extent that EPA regards past state 
enforcement efforts as ineffective, the second element of its CWAP strategy also implicates our 
“reality check” feature.  Thus, EPA’s goal of strengthening state performance bears on at least 
four of the elements of our conceptual framework for improving regulatory design. 
C. Improving Accountability and Transparency 
The third theme around which EPA and its stakeholders coalesced in the CWAP is the 
need to improve accountability and transparency.
164
  Related to the prior two themes, EPA 
acknowledged that it “lacks nationally consistent and complete information on the facilities, 
permits, pollutant discharges and compliance status of most NPDES-regulated facilities.”165  
Data problems exist across the board, including “data quality, accuracy, and completeness.”166   
Inevitably, the infrastructure problem these data gaps represent “affects the ability of EPA and 
states to identify violations . . . , connect violations to water quality impacts, and to share 
information with the public.”167  The Plan notes that the “breadth and expanding scope of the 
NPDES regulated universe” heightens the challenge of responding to the long-standing data 
problems.
168
  The CWAP indicates that, because of the size of the challenge and the costs 
involved (it would cost over $100 million/year to generate the data EPA would like to have), 
EPA will explore new ways to fill these data gaps, including using technological advances.
169
   
Innovative information-gathering technologies may facilitate the ability of regulators and 
potential private enforcers to identify regulatory violations.  Geographic information systems, 
global positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already support the 
investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in ways that were not previously 
possible.
170
  Some of this technology is available to the public at little or no cost from the U.S. 
Geological Survey or state governments.  Data such as aerial photography that can help identify 
past environmental conditions, violations, and violators may not be available elsewhere.
171
  As 
                                                             
163
 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
164
 Thus, this theme bears on the third and fifth features of effective regulation we describe above.  See supra Part I. 
165
 CWAP, supra note ___, at 10. 
166
 Id. 
167
 Id.  
168
 Id.  
169
 See 78 Fed. Reg. 76,005 (July 30, 2013), for the rulemaking EPA has proposed to require electronic reporting 
that the agency hopes will address quality, accuracy, completeness, and timeliness concerns associated with its data. 
170
 See Peter Stokely, Using Aerial Photography, Geospatial Data, and GIS to Support the Enforcement of 
Environmental Statutes, 28-Summer NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 38 (2013).  Remote sensing is “the science and art 
of obtaining information about an object, area, or phenomenon through the analysis of data acquired by a device not 
in contact with the object, area, or phenomenon under investigation.”  Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and 
Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 219, 221 (2002). 
171
 Stokely, supra note___, at 39 (“In many instances, historical aerial photography is the only data source about past 
environmental conditions and can help catch a polluter or identify a past pollution source.”); id. at 42 (asserting that 
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Professor Dan Esty has noted, “[t]echnological advances in data collection, analysis, and 
dissemination have the potential to revolutionize our response to environmental problems.”172  
Thus, for example: 
Breakthroughs in nanotechnologies and small-scale sensors . . .  have begun to provide a 
vastly improved ability to detect and measure pollutants at a fine-grained level. Similarly, 
remote sensing from satellites in space and other new macroscale sensor technologies 
appear poised to provide on-the-ground monitoring of environmental conditions from 
anywhere, at any time, at increasingly low cost.  We thus are approaching the day when 
virtually all emissions will be susceptible to tagging, tracking, and measurement at 
relatively low cost. 
Air emissions already are being tracked with a degree of sophistication that was 
unimaginable just a few years ago.  Gaussian plume analysis now permits regulators to 
plot the drift of air pollutants with increasing precision.  Advances in meteorological 
modeling have further enhanced our ability to understand the sources and “receptors” of 
air pollution. Similar gains are being made in tracing pollutants as they flow through 
watersheds and hydrological systems.
173
 
Esty adds that, “[s]imply put, these gains in data management, analysis, and retrieval make 
possible a more empirical and quantitative approach to environmental protection.”174  These data 
can facilitate efforts to induce higher compliance levels by motivating regulated parties to 
comply without the need for enforcement action and by strengthening deterrence by providing 
information that facilitates proof that violations have occurred.
175
  
The dynamic nature of changes in information technology means that the economics, 
feasibility, and chances for success of enforcement will not remain static, likely resulting in a 
shift in the balance of public and private enforcement over time.  As monitoring technology 
improves, for example, it may become cheaper for NGOs to acquire the data they need to support 
private enforcement actions.  Professor Engstrom regards as “overblown and indeterminate” the 
zealousness critique of private enforcement, which identifies as costs of private enforcement 
overexpenditure of social resources and costly overdeterrence.
176
  If this critique is at all 
accurate, however, improvements in monitoring technology may exacerbate the 
“overzealousness” of private enforcement by reducing the costs of the fact-gathering needed to 
support allegations of noncompliance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
“aerial photograph and mapping, particularly historical aerial photography and maps, can be also key pieces to the 
environmental enforcement puzzle”).  Cf. Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The Promise 
and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1565, 1592-93 
(2012) (describing utility of GIS data about environmental conditions to urban planners and policymakers). 
172
 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 156-57 (2004),  
173
 Id.  
174
 Id. at 158.  The use of better monitoring technology is a critical element of EPA’s Next Generation Compliance 
approach, including use of “field technologies to get real-time information on ambient conditions and compliance.”  
EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note __, at 7. 
175
 Markowitz, supra note ___, at 228-29. 
176
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 10-11]. 
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Similarly, improvements in monitoring technology also may affect gatekeeping design 
decisions animated by the legislative fidelity critique of private enforcement that Professor 
Engstrom references, which is based on the political accountability of public but not private 
enforcers.  The lack of accountability of private enforcers creates a risk of legislative drift if 
private enforcers “develop and press novel applications of legal mandates that public enforcers, 
exercising sound prosecutorial discretion, would forgo as inconsistent with original legislative 
intent.  Relentless pursuit of profit thus yields a form of statutory drift and mission creep as 
private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new and democratically unaccountable 
directions.”177  One counter to this argument, noted by Engstrom, is that Congress took into 
account and implicitly endorsed this kind of “zealous” enforcement by private litigants when it 
created citizen suit provisions, thereby “conferring democratic legitimacy, though at a higher 
level of generality,” on such enforcement pursuits.178  To the extent that the legislative drift 
critique has any cogency, however, changes in the nature of monitoring technology, and 
therefore in the implementation of environmental statutes, can spur suits that would not 
otherwise have been brought, adding to the chances that regulatory policy will be set in the 
context of private litigation in ways which Congress or the agency deem unwise.
179
 
Another possible result of better monitoring information that may affect gatekeeping 
design considerations involves the possibility that improvements in monitoring data (to the 
extent they increase the chance of successful prosecution or reduce the cost of pursuing cases) 
may induce government to initiate enforcement action in marginal cases in which it previously 
would not have been cost-justified.  This might reduce the need for private enforcement.  
Similarly, better monitoring information may motivate regulated parties not to violate the law in 
the first place, thereby influencing the universe of cases that deserve formal enforcement, an 
important consideration in gatekeeping regime design. 
Invoking the experience with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, the CWAP 
touts the promise of transparency as a tool to improve compliance.
180
  EPA suggests that public 
                                                             
177
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 15].  This argument has gotten traction with some Supreme Court justices.  
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting) (“A Clean Water Act plaintiff pursuing civil penalties acts as a self-appointed mini-EPA.”). 
178
 Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 15].  Because citizen suits are expressly authorized by statutes such as the 
CWA, and the statutes specify who can sue and under what circumstances, private individuals and NGOs that 
qualify to bring such suits are not self-appointed at all. 
179
 As Engstrom points out, judges are participants in litigation and may have their own policy preferences, which 
exacerbate the risks of drift from legislative purposes.  Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 15] (quoting Frederick 
Schauer & Richard Zeckhauer, The Trouble with Cases, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
ECONOMICS AND LAW 45, 47 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011)) (“[T]he policy that emerges from litigation [will] be 
systematically based on an imperfect picture of the terrain that the policy is designed to regulate.”). 
180
 The TRI program was created by § 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729, 1741 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11023).  It requires facilities that manufacture, 
process, or use toxic chemicals listed by EPA in amounts that exceed designated threshold quantities to complete 
and submit to EPA and state officials toxic chemical release forms.  The submitted information is made available to 
inform persons about toxic chemical releases, assist agencies and researchers in conducting research and data 
gathering, and aid in the development of appropriate regulations.  42 U.S.C. § 11023(h).  The TRI program may be 
less than an ideal model for improving transparency and verifiability.  See, e.g., M.B. Pell, Ryan McNeill & Selam 
Genrakidan, Exclusive: U.S. system for flagging hazardous chemicals is widely flawed, REUTERS, July 8, 2013, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSBRE9670K720130708 (describing investigation 
concluding that the TRI reporting program is plagued by scant oversight by EPA and the states and by incomplete or 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF 
AUTHORS 
 
35 
 
pressure and greater regulated party self-awareness can both motivate better performance.  For 
our purposes, the key point is that, in identifying strategies to improve compliance, EPA is 
looking well beyond ex post enforcement and considering a range of tools throughout the 
regulatory process (our first characteristic).  In doing so, it is by no means dismissing the value 
of traditional enforcement; it is simply calling for use of additional tools to address compliance 
challenges, a position we have taken in previous work
181
 and which academic literatures 
support.
182
  According to EPA, “[t]ransparency is not a replacement for regulatory enforcement, 
but can be an effective driver for improved performance and accountability.”183  This third 
significant theme of EPA’s reinvention effort reflects EPA’s view that rationalization (to use 
Professor Engstrom’s term) of ex post enforcement by public and private actors is only part of 
the answer to altering sub-optimal regulatory design to enhance compliance.  The CWAP’s third 
theme also illustrates how considerations relating to hybrid governance and the dynamic nature 
of the regulatory environment can affect regulatory design choices, and that these aspects of 
regulatory design may affect key characteristics of effective regulation, including 
implementability, verifiability, the creation of appropriate compliance incentives, and regulatory 
legitimacy.  The point is that optimal regulatory design of gatekeeping structures will shift over 
time as technology advances, government capacity evolves in other ways,
184
 and more is learned 
about what works and what doesn’t to motivate regulated party compliance.  Decisions about the 
design of such structures should be made with the dynamic character of optimality in mind. 
IV. Conclusion 
In Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, Professor David Engstrom tackles the challenge 
of regulatory design across the agency landscape with a particular focus on the rationalization of 
regulatory enforcement by government and private enforcers.  Engstrom, appropriately in our 
view, suggests that enforcement is not likely to be either entirely public or private; instead, the 
design challenge is to consider how best to rationalize enforcement actions by both sets of actors.  
Further, he suggests that in addition to using litigation rules to achieve an optimal form of 
rationalization it is possible to design agency gatekeeping of private enforcement to advance this 
goal.  Engstrom offers a continuum of government gatekeeping design options from more to less 
interventionist.   
Our purpose in this Essay is to highlight the importance that context plays in regulatory 
design, and based on EPA’s experience, to suggest our own five-part conceptual framework for 
how to approach optimal regulatory design.  First, efforts to advance optimal regulatory design 
need to consider the fundamentally inter-related character of the regulatory process.  We offer a 
taxonomy of the regulatory process that highlights key features of that process and provide 
illustrations of the types of interconnections that require attention as part of optimal regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
inaccurate reporting by regulated entities, and charging that EPA and most states “make no effort to verify the 
[reported] data”). 
181
 See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __.  Cf. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, 
The Relative Efficacy of Coercive and Cooperative Enforcement Approaches to Water Pollution Control, in NEXT 
GENERATION COMPLIANCE (L. Paddock & J. Wentz, eds., Envtl Law Inst., forthcoming) [hereinafter NEXT 
GENERATION COMPLIANCE] (discussing deterrence-based, cooperative, and “responsive” regulatory approaches). 
182
 See, e.g., GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note _; NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note ___. 
183
 CWAP, supra note ___, at 10.  
184
 See Grabowsky, supra note 65. 
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design efforts.
185
  Second, efforts to achieve optimal regulatory design should be mindful of the 
hybrid character of contemporary governance.  Even if the goal is to rationalize agency 
gatekeeping of private enforcement, design should take into account how best to engage all 
stakeholders in different stages of the regulatory process, not just public officials and NGO 
litigants during the ex post stage of enforcement litigation.  Third, we suggest that optimal 
regulatory design, whether of agency gatekeeping of private enforcement or otherwise, requires 
what we term a “reality check” contextual feature.  It is critical to assess the agency’s (here 
EPA’s) actual performance in conducting enforcement, the challenges it faces, and available 
opportunities to improve performance.  Fourth, we suggest regulatory designers must consider 
the degree of dynamism – the likelihood that capabilities and interests of different key actors 
throughout the entire regulatory enterprise will change over time in ways that impact the 
effectiveness of regulation.  Finally, we suggest that in a world of limited resources regulatory 
designers should consider the salience of revisiting the design of particular phases of the 
regulatory process and prioritize efforts to redesign regulatory components accordingly. 
We also provide a set of gauges for effective regulation that may be useful in assessing 
regulatory design options that emerge from this interconnected framework, including clarity, 
workability, verifiability, the creation of appropriate incentives for regulated entities, and 
legitimacy.  Finally, in response to Professor Engstrom’s call for greater rationalization of public 
and private enforcement, we broaden the focus to regulatory design of optimal compliance 
structures generally, including but not limited to integration of public and private enforcement, 
by sketching out the compliance challenges currently facing EPA and EPA’s attempt to address 
these challenges by engaging in efforts to enhance compliance under a key environmental 
statute, the CWA.  Our discussion of these challenges and potential solutions illustrates the value 
of taking the multi-faceted approach to regulatory design we recommend and the potential our 
approach has for more effectively fostering statutory compliance. 
At its heart, a strong pragmatic orientation grounds this Essay.  We have developed what 
we hope is a conceptual framework for improving regulatory design that offers a somewhat 
different, yet complementary lens for thinking about regulatory design than the approach by 
Professor Engstrom that has prompted our assessment.   
                                                             
185
 This interconnection is important in multiple ways.  For example, design and implementation of other stages of 
the regulatory process influence optimal design and implementation of the gatekeeping element that Professor 
Engstrom highlights.  In addition, design and implementation of this gatekeeping element may affect design and 
implementation of other aspects of the regulatory process. 
